In our view, the language of the provision is plain. Section
6.1(1)(a) of the CRA precludes the disclosure not only of the
record, but also of the existence and fact of an absolute discharge
beyond one year following its imposition, unless the prior
approval of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is obtained.
 The time-limited relevance of discharges may be contrasted with the treatment of record suspensions under s. 7.2 of the
CRA. Unlike absolute discharges, which may be considered without ministerial approval only for a period of one year after imposition, record suspensions are automatically revoked upon
a subsequent conviction, whenever it occurs, and so may be disclosed without approval.
 The prohibition on disclosure of discharges is complete.
Section 6.1(1)(a) of the CRA precludes disclosure not to selected
persons but to any person. It is of no moment whether the record remains in provincial record bases; it cannot be disclosed
without the minister’s prior approval, and that approval was not
obtained in this case prior to sentencing by the trial judge. The
appeal judge properly concluded that the trial judge erred in
considering the respondent’s absolute discharge, although
the Crown was entitled to put before the court “the factual reality that the incident on which there has been a plea is not the
B. The Remittal Issue
 The second ground of appeal relates to the disposition
ordered by the appeal judge. After determining that the sentenc-
ing judge had erred in taking into account the previous discharge
in imposing sentence, the appeal judge remitted the case to the
OCJ for sentencing.
 The appellant says that the appeal judge had no authority
to remit the case to the OCJ for sentencing. On appeals from sentence in summary conviction proceedings, an appeal judge, like
this court in sentence appeals in indictable proceedings, may only
dismiss the appeal or vary the sentence within the limits prescribed by law.
 The respondent contends that the argument advanced by
the appellant assumes that the appeal from sentence was taken
under s. 813(a)( ii) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46,
thus making s. 822(6) the statutory provision that governs disposition of the appeal and forecloses the remittal order made by the
appeal judge. But the notice of appeal makes no mention of s. 813
as the right of appeal invoked. And since the remittal order could
be made under s. 834(1)(b) of the Criminal Code on an appeal