operation of a predecessor to the Competition Act, and concluded,
at p. 354 S.C.R.:
The courts in these cases have said in various ways that compliance with the
edicts of a validly enacted provincial measure can hardly amount to something contrary to the public interest. Since all the cases examined above
approach the CIA on the basis of a criminal charge, actually or potentially
arising under it, the element of public interest was always present. In Can.
Breweries, the Court proceeded on the basis that the word “unduly” in s. 32
connotes substantially the same meaning as the more general words in the
same statute “operated or is likely to operate to the detriment or against the
interest of the public”. Even the 1975 amendments to s. 32, by the addition of
subs. 1.1, did not remove “unduly” from the operative provision, s. 32(1).
So long as the CIA, or at least Part V, is styled as a criminal prohibition, proceedings in its implementation and enforcement will require a demonstration
of some conduct contrary to the public interest. It is this element of the federal
legislation that, these cases all conclude, can be negated by the authority
extended by a valid provincial regulatory statute.
(Emphasis added; citations omitted)
 In Jabour, the Law Society disciplined a lawyer for advertising, characterizing that action as “conduct unbecoming
a member of the Society” contrary to the Legal Professions Act,
R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 214. Although the Law Society’s enabling legislation did not specifically authorize it to prohibit advertising by
lawyers, the general power it had to govern the legal profession in
the public interest and decide what was “conduct unbecoming”
a lawyer was sufficient to constitute “authority extended by a valid
provincial regulatory statute” (Jabour, at p. 354 S.C.R.) and insulate its activities from the reach of the predecessor to the
Competition Act: Jabour, at p. 341 S.C.R.
 Similarly, in Industrial Milk Producers Assn. v. British
Columbia (Milk Board),  F.C.J. No. 7,  1 F.C. 463, at
pp. 478-79 F.C., the court held that provincial authority for the
regulatory regime, which would permit the operation of the regulated conduct defence, could be express or implied. The court found
that the Milk Board’s authorization to allocate quotas and control
the marketing of milk was much more specific than the broad
authority provided to the Law Society in Jabour to govern the legal
profession in the public interest: Milk Board, at p. 478 F.C.
Milk Board described the authority granted to the Law Society in
Jabour as a “very open ended and general” grant of statutory
authority that could benefit from the leeway extended by the
federal legislation and enable the regulated conduct defence to
operate: Milk Board, at p. 478 F.C.
 In support of their argument that the regulated conduct
defence has no application unless the impugned conduct is specifically authorized by the legislative regime, the appellants rely on
Fournier Leasing Co. v. Mercedes-Benz Canada Inc.,  O.J.