While the appellants rely on Fournier to argue that the
direction or authorization must be specific, they take issue with
Fournier’s holding, adopted by the motion judge, that the direction or authorization may be by necessary implication, and need
not be express. I agree with the motion judge that the direction or
authorization may be by necessary implication. The purpose of
the regulated conduct defence and the leeway granted under the
Competition Act is to allow room for implementation of provincial
public policy expressed in legislative form. Both an express grant
of authority and a grant of authority by necessary implication
advance those provincial legislative interests and I see no reason
to distinguish between them for the purposes of the regulated
conduct defence. It is not a difference of substance from an
express grant of authority where, as a matter of statutory interpretation, it must necessarily be implied that the legislature gave
a regulatory body authority to engage in the impugned conduct in
order to advance legislative goals.
 The appellants also argue that the use of the word
“authorization” in s. 45(7) imports a requirement that the conduct prohibited by the Competition Act be specifically authorized
by the regulatory legislation.
 I do not accept this argument. Section 45(7) of the
Competition Act provides that the rules and principles of common
law that render a requirement or authorization by or under an
Act of a provincial legislature a defence to a prosecution under
the Act continue in force. Jabour was decided before s. 45(7) was
enacted. As I have indicated earlier, Jabour demonstrates that
a general authority such as that given to a law society to regulate
the conduct of its members may enable the regulated conduct
defence to operate. There is nothing in the language of s. 45(7)
that suggests a legislative intention to change the common law
interpretation of “authority”; rather, the expressed intention is to
preserve the common law. As indicated in Jabour, at p. 354 S.C.R.
culpability under the federal legislation can be “negated by the
authority extended by a valid provincial regulatory statute”.
There is no basis to conclude that s. 45(7) was intended to narrow
the scope of the meaning of “authority” or “authorization”.
 This legislative expression of the regulated conduct
defence earlier articulated in Jabour did not alter the degree of
specificity of the legislative authorization required to allow the
defence to operate.
 I turn then to an examination of the authority granted to
the LCBO under the Liquor Control Act at the time of the