appeared on June 2000. They claim that the beer respondents,
which owned 90 per cent of Brewers Retail Inc. at the time, were
unjustly enriched by the collection of this surcharge.
 The appellants argue that the motion judge erred in his
interpretation of the Liquor Control Act, as it appeared on June
2000, and that, correctly interpreted, the surcharge violated that
Act. Further, they argue that, even if constitutional, retroactive
legislation cannot be considered when determining whether there
was a juristic reason for a defendant’s enrichment. In their view,
only legislation in effect at the time of the enrichment can
provide a juristic reason.
 The relevant statutory provision of the Liquor Control Act
reads as follows:
Power and purposes of Board
3(1) The purposes of the Board are, and it has power,
( i) to fix the prices at which the various classes, varieties and brands
of liquor are to be sold and, except in the case of liquor sold through
an outlet designated by the Minister of National Revenue under
the Excise Act (Canada) as a duty free sales outlet, such prices shall
be the same at all government stores.
 The appellants’ argument is that the plain meaning of this
provision requires that the same price be charged to all beer purchasers and that differential prices to licensees are not permitted.
The respondents’ argument is that this provision was intended to
require that no differential price be imposed according to the geographic location of the buyer and to eliminate higher costs for
beer in Northern Ontario. In the respondents’ view, this provision
does not prohibit differential pricing among classes, varieties
and brands as long as the price for each is the same at all government stores (subject to the exception). Accordingly, just as the
price for six-packs of beer and 12-packs, for example, can diverge
so long as the price for each is the same at all government stores,
so can the price of liquor (which includes beer) intended for sale
to each channel of consumer and licensee purchasers diverge. The
respondents argue that this interpretation is consistent with
decades of LCBO and Brewers Retail Inc. practice. They therefore
submit that s. 3(1)( i) permits the LCBO to differentiate as to
price between consumers and licensees.
 The motion judge favoured the interpretation advanced by
the respondents, and, at paras. 257-259 of his reasons, stated:
The approach to interpretation is teleological or purposeful and to interpret
a statute, the words of the statute are to be read in their entire context and in