their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the
statute, the object of the statute, and the intention of the legislator.
Following this purposefully approach to interpretation, I favour the interpretation advanced by the Defendants. Their interpretation is supported
by: (a) the legislative history; (b) a proper contextual and purposeful reading
of s. 3(1)( i); and (c) how the section has been interpreted and applied for decades by the parties subject to it, including the LCBO which is the regulator
under the legislative scheme.
When interpreting a specialized public law statute, the public statements of
the regulator about the scope of its home statute and the administrative practice and interpretation adopted by the regulator, while not determinative, are
important factors to be weighed in interpreting the statute.
 I need not resolve this issue of statutory interpretation as
the government of Ontario enacted s. 3(1.1) of the Liquor Control
Act, as amended by Building Ontario Up Act (Budget Measures),
2015, s. 3(4), in 2015, which retroactively authorized the price differential in issue here:
3(1.1) The Board’s purposes and powers also include, and are deemed
always to have included, the purpose and power to fix the prices at which the
various classes, varieties and brands of liquor are to be sold, and such prices
shall be the same at all government stores except,
(a) liquor sold through an outlet designated by the Minister of
National Revenue under the Excise Act (Canada) as a duty free
sales outlet; and
(b) liquor sold to holders of a licence under the Liquor Licence Act,
which may be sold at a price that is different from the price at which
it is sold to the general public.
 As indicated above, in relation to retroactive authorization
of beer market allocation, this retroactive legislation declares
what the law was. It deems that the law always included the right
to price differentiate between licensee purchasers and members
of the public.
 I reject the appellants’ argument that juristic reason
cannot be provided by retroactive legislation. This deeming provision supplies the juristic reason for the enrichment and puts
an end to the appellants’ action for damages for unjust enrichment: Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., at para. 49. There is no
doubt that retroactive legislation can defeat financial expectations based on the law in place before the retroactive amendment.
(3) Misconduct by a civil authority
 The appellants rely on Paradis Honey Ltd. v. Canada
(Attorney General),  F.C.J. No. 399, 2015 FCA 89,