level of understanding of the consequences of entry of guilty pleas
generally. No trial. Conviction. Sentence. No case suggests that
knowledge of “consequences” includes knowledge of appellate
rights and their limitations.
 In this case, the appellant was aware from what he had
been told and documents he had received from an Immigration
Enforcement Officer that convictions and sentences had immigration consequences. Those consequences included removal from
Canada. He was also aware that both criminal convictions and
the sentences imposed were the reasons for those consequences.
 He learned further that he “may or may not have the right
to appeal to the Immigration Division should a removal order be
issued” against him. He was also aware that “a term of imprisonment of at least six months” meant that he had no right of
appeal from the removal order. And he was invited to make written submissions explaining why his removal should not be
sought. In addition, the appellant was aware that he would
be pleading guilty, as he had in all other cases involving his
spouse, and that his lawyer and the Crown would be asking the
judge to impose a sentence of 12 months in custody followed by
probation for three years.
 In my respectful view, in the circumstances of this case,
the appellant had an adequate understanding of the immigration
consequences of his plea of guilty and the proposed sentence,
which he understood the judge was not required to impose on the
lawyers’ say-so. In particular, he was aware that those consequences included removal from Canada — perhaps without
a right to appeal the removal decision.
 As in Coffey to which I have earlier referred, there is also
an element of wilful blindness in the appellant’s approach: see
Coffey, at paras. 47-51. He relied on fellow inmates for legal
advice, rather than picking up counsel’s suggestion of obtaining a
legal aid certificate for immigration purposes. And on his belief,
despite the plain language in the documents he received from the
Immigration Enforcement Officer, that he would only be given
a warning, not removed from the country. He rolled the dice.
 In light of my response to the first inquiry, it is unnecessary to consider the second. That said, I am also satisfied that the
appellant has not established the prejudice component of the test.
 To begin, the appellant’s affidavit is barren of any viable
suggestion that, but for the alleged informational deficit, he
would have pleaded not guilty and taken the case to trial. His
assertion that his estranged spouse would not have testified
against him is completely at odds with her conduct. A trial would