The principles applied
 I would give effect to this ground of appeal. In my respect-
ful view, the trial judge erred in concluding that the text messages
had no probative value because they had not been properly
authenticated by direct evidence.
 To begin, recall how the use of the text messages arose.
Counsel for the appellant C.B. sought to cross-examine D.P. on
her text message exchange with C.B. at times reasonably proximate to the alleged offence. The purpose of this cross-examination was to challenge the veracity of D.P.’s account of relevant events as having occurred without her consent.
 In the cross-examination of D.P., defence counsel produced
photographs of screenshots of messages located on the cellphone
provided by the appellant C.B.’s mother. The photographs of the
text messages had been taken by a private investigator who would
later testify as a defence witness and explain what he had done to
“extract” these contents from the cellphone. No evidence was
called to link the cellphone to the appellant C.B., although a review
of the contents of the messages would support an inference that
the phone was hers, an issue not disputed by the respondent.
 During the course of the cross-examination of D.P. about the
text messages, she acknowledged that the number from or to which
the messages were sent was in fact her cellphone number, and that
she had her phone with her during the relevant time. She also
explained the meaning of one of the texts sent from that cellphone.
The content of the messages is consistent with relevant events
involving D.P. and the appellant C.B. Even if we accept D.P.’s claim
that the appellant C.B. installed an app on D.P.’s cellphone, the
app, she said, allowed the appellant to trace her movements. Such
an assertion falls well short of furnishing an air of reality to a claim
of tampering and would not affect authentication.
 In the result, I am satisfied that these various strands of
evidence were capable of supporting a finding that the text messages were what they purported to be: an exchange of communications between D.P. and the appellant C.B. The trial judge erred
in holding, as he appears to have done, that the authenticity
threshold could only be met by direct evidence from the sender or
expert opinion evidence from a forensic examiner.
 Satisfaction of the evidentiary threshold for authentication
under s. 31. 1 of the CEA or at common law renders the evidence
admissible; in other words, available to the trier of fact for ultimate evaluation. It does not follow from admissibility that the
trier of fact must find that the evidence is in fact what it claims to
be. What remains of the dispute after admissibility has been