The respondent takes no issue with the substance of the
opinion on authenticity provided by Marty Musters, whom counsel did not cross-examine. I am satisfied that his opinion is reasonably capable of belief.
 The final component of the cogency requirement involves
an assessment of whether the opinion evidence, the expert opinion about authenticity, could reasonably be expected to have
affected the verdict at trial. In my respectful view, the proposed
evidence satisfies this aspect of the cogency requirement.
 At trial, the case for the Crown depended on the evidence
of the complainants. For all practical purposes, their testimony
was the case for the Crown. To convict, the trial judge had to be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainants were
credible, their evidence reliable and of such persuasive force that
it excluded any reasonable doubt about the appellants’ guilt.
 In reaching his conclusion that the complainants were
credible and their testimony reliable to such an extent that it
excluded reasonable doubt, the trial judge rejected, as of no probative value, the text messages and photographs on which the
complainants were cross-examined. The judge’s finding of “no
probative value”, thus the lack of any impeachment value, was
grounded on his conclusion that the messages and photographs
were not established as authentic or genuine. But casting aside
this evidence for want of authenticity, the fresh evidence shows,
was wrong. It should have been factored into the credibility/reliability analysis. In the result, I am satisfied that had the
expert opinion of Musters been before the trial judge, it could reasonably be expected to have affected the conclusion reached in
that analysis, thus the verdict rendered at trial.
 What remains is an assessment of whether the due diligence criterion should mandate exclusion of the evidence of
Musters, despite its satisfaction of the conditions precedent to
 On this issue of due diligence, the evidence of trial counsel is relevant. Doubtless, trial counsel could have called the
appellant C.B. or Musters, or some other forensic examiner, to
authenticate the relevant contents of the appellant C.B.’s cellphone. That said, the decision of trial counsel was informed by
her view that the record contained sufficient evidence to authenticate the contents put to the complainants. In this respect, trial
counsel, as I have already explained, was correct. This was a reasonable conclusion in the circumstances, not a failure of due diligence that warrants exclusion of the expert opinion of Musters.