rights under the right-of-way. He further concedes that the
restrictive covenants were effective and binding up until 2006.
Despite the fact they were referenced in the deed by which the
applicant became the owner of No. 99, however, by that point in
time they no longer had any legal effect.
[ 23] The applicant contends that the section means what it says,
namely, the “condition, restriction or covenant” represented by the
restrictive covenants are “deemed to have expired forty years
after” their registration. Since the restrictive covenants contained
no period or fixed date for their expiry, s. 119( 9) applies.
[ 24] The respondents argue that the original conveyance by
which the restrictive covenants were created was a grant to the
“Grantee, its heirs and assigns to and for its sole and only use
forever” (underlining for emphasis). The respondents submit that
by including the words “forever” a period of time was specified,
namely, forever. Thus, they submit, s. 119( 9) has no application.
[ 25] The applicant’s case stands and falls on the interpretation
of s. 119( 9) of the Land Titles Act. For ease of reference, I restate
119( 9) Where a condition, restriction or covenant has been registered as
annexed to or running with the land and no period or date was fixed for its
expiry, the condition, restriction or covenant is deemed to have expired forty
years after the condition, restriction or covenant was registered, and may be
deleted from the register by the land registrar.
[ 26] Both counsel informed the court that they had been
unable to find any case in which this subsection of the Land
Titles Act has been judicially interpreted. Although s. 119( 9) has
been referred to from time to time, the court has not had occasion
to interpret the subsection’s meaning: see Robertson v. Graham,
 O.J. No. 1711, 2017 ONSC 2177 (S.C.J.); Girard (Re),
 O.J. No. 5216, 61 R.P.R. (4th) 288 (S.C.J.); Wiltshire
v. McGill,  O.J. No. 2164, 2005 CarswellOnt 2260 (S.C.J.). It
is therefore necessary to return to first principles.
[ 27] The principles of statutory interpretation were recently
discussed by Chief Justice Strathy in Belwood Lake Cottagers
Assn. Inc. v. Ontario (Ministry of the Environment),  O.J.
No. 485, 2019 ONCA 70, at paras. 39-42, as follows:
The modern approach to statutory interpretation requires a court to con-
sider the words of a statute “in their entire context and in their grammatical
and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the
Act, and the intention of Parliament”: Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec