Inc., 2005 SCC 62,  3 S.C.R. 141, at paras. 9-12, citing Rizzo & Rizzo
Shoes Ltd. (Re),  1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21.
The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words
Both parties rely on the leading text by Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the
Construction of Statutes, 6th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2014), who
summarizes the “ordinary meaning” rule at § 3.6:
It is presumed that the ordinary meaning of a legislative text is the
meaning intended by the legislature. In the absence of a reason to reject
it, the ordinary meaning prevails.
Even if the ordinary meaning is plain, courts must take into account the
full range of relevant contextual considerations, including purpose, related
provisions in the same or other Acts, legislative drafting conventions, presumptions of legislative intent, absurdities to be avoided and the like.
In light of these considerations, the court may adopt an interpretation
that modifies or departs from the ordinary meaning, provided the interpretation is plausible and the reasons for adopting it are sufficient to
justify the departure from ordinary meaning.
Sullivan notes that ordinary meaning is not the end of the process of statu-
tory interpretation, it is simply the beginning. She refers to the observations
of Iacobucci J. in Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2002 SCC 3,  1 S.C.R. 84, at para. 34, in connection with the interpreta-
tion of the Immigration Act:
The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words employed in s. 70( 1)(b)
is not determinative, however, as this Court has long rejected a literal
approach to statutory interpretation. Instead, s. 70( 1)(b) must be read in
its entire context. This inquiry involves examining the history of the
provision at issue, its place in the overall scheme of the Act, the object of
the Act itself, and Parliament's intent both in enacting the Act as a
whole, and in enacting the particular provision at issue.
Thus, the plain meaning of the words of the statute is only one aspect of the
[ 28] Dealing first with the plain meaning of the words of the
s. 119( 9) of the Land Titles Act, the key words are “no period or
date was fixed for its expiry” and “the . . . covenant is deemed to
have expired forty years after the . . . covenant was registered”.
In Black’s Law Dictionary, the word expire is cross-referenced to
the term expiration. The definition of expiration is “cessation,
termination from mere lapse of time, as the expiration of the
lease, insurance policy, statute, and the like. Coming to close;
termination or end.”
[ 29] The term “expire” was considered by the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal in Walmart Canada Corp. v. UFCW, Local 1400,
 S.J. No. 415, 2010 SKCA 89. In that case, the court noted
(at para. 36) as follows:
It is also significant that the ordinary sense of the word “expire” is not
restricted in the way suggested by Walmart. It can mean the termination of