to prove actual knowledge that another would intentionally kill
 The effect of the trial judge’s misdirection was exacerbated, the appellant argues, by what Crown counsel said in his
closing address about the state of mind required for murder. In
describing the elements in s. 229(a)( ii), Crown counsel failed to
include the knowledge component — “means to cause him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his death” — in his
submissions. This is wrong and has the effect of leaving liability for murder to be determined on a more expansive basis
than the law requires. The Crown’s misstatement was not
corrected by the trial judge’s proper s. 229(a)( ii) instruction
because it was followed by an incomprehensible instruction on
common purpose. The trial judge aggravated the prejudice
that the misstatement caused by repeating the Crown’s submission when outlining the position of the Crown in his charge
to the jury.
 The appellant concludes that in a case in which the nature
of the injuries inflicted said little about the assailant’s state of
mind, the instructions on the mental element to prove the appellant’s guilt of second degree murder were erroneous and so
confusing as to leave the jury in a state of uncertainty about the
precise standard they were to apply in resolving the single
controverted issue on this count at trial. The failure of trial counsel to object on this ground does not convert what was wrong into
something that was right.
 The respondent begins with a reminder that we should not
focus on a handful of words removed from their surroundings,
but rather consider the charge as a whole, along with the decision
tree provided to the jury, the positions advanced by counsel and
the evidence adduced at trial. When this is done, as the authorities require, the instructions meet the standard required of them:
proper, not perfect.
 The final instructions, the respondent says, make it clear
that s. 21(2) was not a basis upon which the appellant could be
found guilty of either second degree murder or attempted murder.
He could only be found guilty on those counts with which he
alone was charged as a principal, the person who actually committed the offence. The parties’ provisions, the judge explained to
the jury, applied only to the counts of manslaughter and aggravated assault, counts two and four in the indictment, with which
the appellant was not charged.
 The respondent acknowledges that the trial judge
misspoke when he said to the jury that s. 21(2) applied “to all
counts”. But the balance of the charge made it clear that