somewhat muddled passage on the mental element, I would
not give effect to this ground of appeal for several reasons.
 First, it would not be lost on a contemporary Canadian
jury that the appellant was the only person charged with
second degree murder and attempted murder. All the parties in
the trial said so. And so did the indictment of which the jury
had a copy. The case presented against him by the Crown, and
argued by both the Crown and defence counsel, was that the
appellant was the person who stabbed both the deceased and
Mao Kim, killing one of them, and seriously injuring the other.
Said in another way, the trial proceeded on the basis that it
was the appellant and only the appellant who actually committed
the offences with which he, and he alone, was charged. None of
the six separate jury addresses contained any suggestion that
the appellant was anything other than the principal, the one
and only principal.
 Second, in introducing his instructions about modes of
participation, the trial judge, in explaining the liability of a prin-
Sinhem Srun is charged alone with the second degree murder of Vandin Svay
and attempted murder of Mao Kim. He can only be a principal participant in
 Third, in his instructions on the specific counts of second
degree murder and attempted murder in which the appellant
alone was charged, the trial judge explained what the Crown had
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the appellant’s
guilt. The trial judge converted the essential elements of each
offence, all of which were the subject of legally correct instructions, into questions for the jury to consider and advised them of
the verdict and further deliberation consequences of the decisions
available to them on each issue. Throughout these instructions,
the appellant’s participation was left as a principal, the sole principal. No instructions were given about any other mode of participation, including s. 21(2), on these two counts.
 Fourth, the decision trees provided to the jury as deliberation aids on the counts of second degree murder and attempted
murder duplicated the questions posed for the jury in the charge.
Although decision trees are not themselves legal instructions,
they made it plain and obvious in diagrammatic form that the appellant’s liability was as a principal and only as a principal. In
this respect, the decision trees in connection with the co-accused,
charged jointly with manslaughter and aggravated assault, make
it equally obvious that their liability was to be resolved as aiders,
abettors or s. 21(2) parties.