The ruling of the trial judge
 The trial judge ruled that Heang’s statement was admissible only in relation to its maker. He rejected the submission of
trial counsel for the appellant that the statement, at least its
“exculpatory parts”, should be admitted as evidence for the appellant.
 Trial counsel for the appellant did not seek the admission
of Heang’s statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, or on the basis that the rigours of the hearsay rule
should be relaxed, since the proponent of the evidence was an
accused charged with serious offences.
The jury instructions
 None of the accused testified or called evidence at trial.
 The trial judge instructed the jury on its use of the police
interview of Kimsan Heang twice in the course of his charge. In
each passage, one of which included a R. v. W. (D.),  1 S.C.R.
742,  S.C.J. No. 26 instruction, the trial judge told the
jury that the interview applied only to their consideration of
the case against Kimsan Heang and not to any co-accused even if
the interview referred to something said or done by a co-accused.
The arguments on appeal
 According to the appellant, several portions of Kimsan
Heang’s police interview were exculpatory of the appellant, and
thus beneficial to the defence he advanced at trial. The absence of
any intention to engage in violence at the party, much less to kill
anyone there. The spontaneous and consensual nature of the
fight amongst those involved. The relative numbers of those
involved on both sides of the fray.
 The appellant accepts the general rule that when the
Crown introduces an out-of-court statement by one of several
co-accused in a joint trial under the admissions doctrine, the
statement is evidence only in relation to its maker. This is so even
if the statement refers to things done or said by persons other
than its maker, as for example, by co-accused.
 Despite this general rule, the appellant says, there are
two routes by which Heang’s police interview can become
evidence for the jury to consider in deciding the case of the
 In R. v. Waite,  S.C.R. 341,  S.C.J. No. 17,
2014 SCC 17, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed for the
possibility that an accused could seek to have the out-of-court
statements of a co-accused admitted for their truth under the