2018 NBCA 56, 365 C.C.C. (3d) 498, at para. 77; Bradshaw, at
 Even where the proponent of hearsay evidence satisfies
the necessity and reliability requirements of the principled
approach to hearsay, it does not follow that the hearsay statement
will be admitted. The trial judge retains a discretion to exclude
otherwise admissible hearsay where its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect: Hawkins, at para. 85; Khelawon,
at paras. 3, 49; Bradshaw, at para. 24. But where the proponent
of the evidence is an accused, this exclusionary discretion becomes
engaged only where the probative value of the statement is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect: R. v. Seaboyer; R. v.
Gayme,  2 S.C.R. 577,  S.C.J. No. 62, at p. 611 S.C.R.
 The final point concerns the availability of a judicial
discretion to admit hearsay evidence under the principled exception despite the proponent’s failure to satisfy the requirements of
that exception. This discretion may be exercised when the
proponent of the evidence is an accused and the admission of the
evidence is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice: R. v.
Kimberley (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 18,  O.J. No. 3603, 157
C.C.C. (3d) 129 (C.A.), at para. 80, leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused  S.C.C.A. No. 29. But this inclusionary discretion is
not so expansive as to countenance an abandonment of the
inquiry into threshold reliability: Kimberley, at paras. 80-81.
The principles applied
 For reasons that I will develop, I would not accede to this
ground of appeal.
 The starting point is the general rule. And the general
rule is and remains that out-of-court statements made by one of
several co-accused not in furtherance of a common unlawful
design tendered by the Crown in a joint trial are admissible only
in relation to their maker. Where, as here, another accused in
that joint trial seeks to make some other evidentiary use of
a co-accused’s out-of-court statement, it falls to that accused to
satisfy the requirements for the proposed use of the evidence,
including any applicable admissibility rules.
 In this case, the appellant sought the introduction of the
co-accused Heang’s out-of-court statement in order to establish
the truth of some of its contents which he claimed were exculpatory of him, at least about the legal characterization of the
unlawful killing. In this respect, he was confronted by the
hearsay rule. Unless he could bring his claim within a listed
exception (none is advanced) or the principled exception, he
was bound to fail in his request.