In my view, the trial judge’s decision is both supportable
on the record and apparent from the circumstances. First, with
respect to his s. 9(2) ruling, each of the prior statements on which
the Crown was permitted to cross-examine Mr. Clark was inconsistent with his trial testimony. There was no question about this.
For example, at the preliminary inquiry, Mr. Clark testified that
the appellant shot Mr. Akindejoye. At trial, however, Mr. Clark
testified that he himself shot Mr. Akindejoye. This is not a case
where it was arguable whether there was an inconsistency.
 Second, Mr. Clark’s preliminary inquiry testimony and
pre-trial motion testimony were properly admitted pursuant to
the principled exception to the rule against hearsay. Contrary to
the appellant’s submissions, I believe that this court is well-placed to determine the correctness of the trial judge’s B. (K.G.)
ruling. As I will explain when I address the admissibility of Mr.
Clark’s preliminary inquiry testimony, this was not a case where
the trial judge had to make assessments of credibility in determining whether the evidence should be admitted. Briefly, since
Mr. Clark’s hearsay evidence was admissible due to its procedural
reliability, the trial judge was not obliged to evaluate Mr. Clark’s
credibility. That task was properly left to the jury. Accordingly,
this court is able to stand in the trial judge’s shoes to determine
whether Mr. Clark’s evidence should have been admitted.
 In light of my decision to allow the appeal on the W. (D.)
ground of appeal (discussed below), it is not necessary to determine whether the trial judge was obligated to provide reasons
pursuant to the duty of procedural fairness, thereby committing
a reversible error by failing to do so.
(2) The admission of Mr. Clark’s preliminary inquiry testimony
for its truth
 The appellant submits that Mr. Clark’s preliminary inquiry
testimony should not have been admitted for its truth under the
principled exception to hearsay evidence. He concedes that the
necessity criterion was established when Mr. Clark recanted his
preliminary inquiry testimony. He also concedes that threshold
reliability was satisfied, since the Crown established there were
adequate substitutes for testing Mr. Clark’s preliminary inquiry
testimony ( i.e., procedural reliability): see R. v. Bradshaw, 
1 S.C.R. 865,  S.C.J. No. 35, 2017 SCC 35, at paras. 27-29, 32;
R. v. Mohamad,  O.J. No. 6302, 2018 ONCA 966, 369 C.C.C.
(3d) 211, at para. 115. He argues, however, that Mr. Clark’s preliminary inquiry testimony had no probative value because it was
inherently unreliable, and that the trial judge should accordingly
have exercised his residual discretion to exclude it from evidence.