concedes that threshold reliability was established with respect to
Mr. Clark’s preliminary inquiry testimony. Indeed, preliminary
inquiry testimony typically satisfies the requirement of threshold
reliability due to its procedural reliability: R. v. Hawkins (1996),
30 O.R. (3d) 641,  3 S.C.R. 1043,  S.C.J. No. 117, at
paras. 76-77; Mohamad, at para. 109. Mr. Clark testified under
oath and was subjected to contemporaneous cross-examination.
Having established the procedural reliability of Mr. Clark’s
statement, the Crown was not required to go on to prove its substantive reliability: Mohamad, at para. 115; Couture, at para. 87.
 The appellant contends, however, that Mr. Clark’s state-
ment was so inherently unreliable that it had no probative value,
and that the trial judge was therefore obligated to exclude it pur-
suant to his residual discretion, despite the fact that the state-
ment clearly met the procedural reliability threshold. In support
of this argument, the appellant relies on comments made by this
court in R. v. Humaid (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 456,  O.J. No.
1507 (C.A.), at para. 57, leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed 
S.C.C.A. No. 232, which were subsequently endorsed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Blackman,  2 S.C.R. 298,
 S.C.J. No. 38, 2008 SCC 37, at para. 51. Specifically, he
relies on the following passage from Humaid, at para. 57:
A trial judge has a residual discretion to exclude evidence where its potential
probative value is exceeded by the potential prejudicial effect of that evidence.
This discretion extends to what would otherwise be admissible hearsay
evidence. There may be cases where the credibility or reliability of the narrator
of the out-of-court statement is so deficient that it robs the out-of-court state-
ment of any potential probative value. In such cases, and I think they would be
relatively rare, a trial judge could conclude that the narrator's evidence was so
incredible or unreliable as to necessitate the exclusion of the evidence based on
the exercise of his or her residual discretion.
(Internal citations omitted; emphasis added)
 The appellant’s reliance on this passage is misplaced.
Blackman and Humaid were both cases in which the declarant
was not available to testify and be cross-examined at trial. Indeed,
both cases involved statements made by the deceased victim (the
declarant) to another individual who was available at trial (the
“narrator” or “recipient”).
 Here, not only was Mr. Clark present at the appellant’s
trial, the circumstances of his prior statement ( i.e., in-court testimony at a preliminary inquiry) was such that there was no
doubt Mr. Clark had made the statement. Indeed, even if Mr.
Clark had not testified at the trial, the transcript of the preliminary inquiry transcript leaves no doubt as to the fact that he
made the impugned statement. The central question in this case