was thus not about the reliability of the statement, but about the
declarant Mr. Clark’s credibility when making it.
 Turning to the trial judge’s exercise of his residual discretion, I disagree with the appellant that the probative value of Mr.
Clark’s preliminary inquiry testimony was outweighed by its
potentially prejudicial effect. The trial judge’s B. (K.G.) ruling
empowered the jury to consider Mr. Clark’s preliminary inquiry
testimony, pre-trial motion testimony, and trial testimony. The
substance of each of these statements was clearly probative of an
issue in dispute. In addition, this was a case where admitting,
rather than excluding, the statements promoted the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial: Bradshaw, at para. 22. The
admission of the statements for their truth allowed the jury to
decide how much weight to afford each of Mr. Clark’s sworn
versions of events in light of his explanation for the inconsistencies: Bradshaw, at para. 22. As the Crown states in its factum,
allowing the jury to consider the substance of all of the admitted
statements was the surest way to promote a fair trial in all the
circumstances of this case: Khelawon, at para. 48.
 On the other side of the ledger, the potentially prejudicial
effect of admitting Mr. Clark’s preliminary inquiry testimony for
its truth was the same as the potentially prejudicial effect of any
hearsay statement. There was a risk that the jury would be confused
about the use they could make of the out-of-court and in-court
statements. This concern was adequately addressed by the trial
judge’s jury instruction. I therefore reject this ground of appeal.
(3) The failure to provide a W. (D.) instruction
 The appellant contends that the trial judge erred by failing
to give a W. (D.) instruction at two junctures in his charge. First,
the appellant submits that a W. (D.) instruction should have been
given with respect to Mr. Clark and Mr. Akindejoye’s respective
evidence that the appellant was not the shooter. Second, he submits that a W. (D.) instruction should have been given in respect
of a passage from Mr. Clark’s preliminary inquiry testimony
where Mr. Clark testified that the appellant told him that he did
not want to kill Mr. Akindejoye, and that he was just going to
send him a message. This was the only direct evidence of the
appellant’s state of mind.
 In his charge, the trial judge walked the jury through each
essential element of the offence of attempted murder. First, he
told the jury that they must determine whether the appellant was
the shooter. Then, he reviewed Mr. Akindejoye’s versions of
events, followed by Mr. Clark’s versions of events. After outlining
the evolution of each witness’s story over time, the trial judge