told the jury that they may accept some, none, or all of the
witnesses’ evidence, and he gave the standard instruction on the
burden of proof. He proceeded in the same fashion for each of the
other elements of the offence.
 When he reached the issue of intent, the trial judge told
the jury to consider all of the evidence, including the “opinions of
witnesses who testified about [the appellant’s] state of mind”. He
noted that Mr. Akindejoye believed that the appellant intended to
kill him. He also noted that, at the preliminary inquiry, Mr. Clark
testified that the appellant did not intend to kill Mr. Akindejoye.
He told the jury to consider the evidence as a whole and use their
common sense in deciding whether intent to kill was established
beyond a reasonable doubt.
 The trial judge then proceeded to instruct the jury on the
elements of discharging a firearm with intent to injure, on the
charge in relation to Mr. Netzereab. He instructed that jury that
they first must determine if the appellant was the shooter and
that his “previous comments” in relation to the identification
 Defence counsel at trial did not ask for a W. (D.) instruction as applied to either witness’s identification evidence. Counsel
did, however, request a W. (D.) instruction as it applied to the
exculpatory passage of Mr. Clark’s preliminary inquiry testimony,
which spoke to the appellant’s state of mind, stating that the
appellant had only intended to send Mr. Akindejoye a message
rather than to kill him. After receiving submissions from counsel,
the trial judge declined to give a W. (D.) instruction in respect of
Mr. Clark’s preliminary inquiry testimony.
 The appellant contends that the jury charge was insufficient. He accepts that it was correct and indeed necessary to
instruct the jury that they may accept some, none, or all of each
witness’s evidence. However, he submits that in the circumstances
of this case, where the jury was faced with two diametrically
opposed versions of events, more was required. On the question of
whether the appellant was the shooter, the appellant submits that
the trial judge was required to add that even if they did not accept
Mr. Clark’s trial testimony, or Mr. Akindejoye’s B. (K.G.) evidence,
but either or both left them with a reasonable doubt as to identity,
they were required to acquit. Additionally, the appellant submits
that the trial judge was obligated to instruct the jury that if Mr.
Clark’s preliminary inquiry testimony about the appellant’s intent
left them with a reasonable doubt as to whether the appellant
intended to kill Mr. Akindejoye, they must find him not guilty of