I agree with the appellant that the trial judge was required
to give a W. (D.)-type instruction in respect of Mr. Clark’s and Mr.
Akindejoye’s exculpatory evidence as to identification. His failure
to do so constitutes reversible error. In the circumstances of this
case, it was not sufficient to instruct the jury on the burden of
proof without relating that instruction to the proper assessment
of Mr. Clark’s trial testimony and pre-trial motion testimony
— which was entirely exculpatory — and Mr. Akindejoye’s
exculpatory B. (K.G.) evidence.
 A W. (D.) instruction is appropriate where the trier of fact
must make credibility findings based on conflicting evidence
going to essential elements of the offence: R. v. Fogah,  O.J.
No. 3402, 2018 ONCA 564, 362 C.C.C. (3d) 4, at paras. 51-55;
R. v. D. (B.),  O.J. No. 198, 2011 ONCA 51, 266 C.C.C. (3d)
197, at para. 114. The need for a W. (D.) instruction may arise, as
here, even when the accused does not testify, or when the defence
calls no evidence. It may arise, as here, when Crown witnesses
give evidence that is exculpatory vis-à-vis the accused: Fogah, at
paras. 48-56; D. (B.), at para. 105.
 This is because a “credibility contest” may equally arise on
an essential element of the offence based on the conflicting
evidence of two non-accused witnesses. As this court stated in
D. (B.), at para. 114:
[T]he principles underlying W. (D.) are not confined merely to cases where an
accused testifies and his or her evidence conflicts with that of Crown witness-
es. They have a broader sweep. Where, on a vital issue, there are credibility
findings to be made between conflicting evidence called by the defence or aris-
ing out of evidence favourable to the defence in the Crown’s case, the trial judge
must relate the concept of reasonable doubt to those credibility findings. The
trial judge must do so in a way that makes it clear to the jurors that it is not
necessary for them to believe the defence evidence on that vital issue; rather, it
is sufficient if — viewed in the context of all of the evidence — the conflicting
evidence leaves them in a state of reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt.
 In this case, the jury was faced with two diametrically
opposed versions of events, both of which were adduced through
witnesses called by the Crown. On the one hand, Mr. Clark’s
trial testimony and pre-trial motion testimony, as well as Mr.
Akindejoye’s B. (K.G.) statements, were entirely exculpatory
vis-à-vis the appellant. Mr. Clark testified that he was the shooter,
and that the appellant was not involved in any way, and Mr.
Akindejoye told the police that he did not know the individuals who
shot him. On the other hand, Mr. Clark’s preliminary inquiry
testimony and Mr. Akindejoye’s trial testimony were generally