opposed version of events, one of which is entirely exculpatory and
the other entirely inculpatory. The jury needed to understand, not
merely that they could accept some, none, or all of each witness’s
evidence, but that they were not tasked with deciding which
version of events was true. I cannot accept that the charge, read as
a whole, adequately conveyed this message to the jury.
 The jury should have been told that if they accepted Mr.
Clark’s trial testimony or pre-trial motion testimony, or Mr.
Akindejoye’s exculpatory B. (K.G.) evidence, they were obligated
to acquit the appellant on both counts. Additionally, they should
have been instructed that, even if they did not accept Mr. Clark’s
or Mr. Akindejoye’s exculpatory evidence, if either or both left
them with a reasonable doubt as to the identity of the shooter,
they were required to acquit the appellant on both counts.
(4) The failure to give a Soobrian limiting instruction in
respect of Mr. Clark’s evidence
 The appellant submits that a “Soobrian limiting instruction” was necessary in this case because there was a danger that
the jury would infer the appellant’s guilt from Mr. Clark’s lack of
credibility: see R. v. Soobrian (1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 603, 
O.J. No. 2836 (C.A.); R. v. Figliola (2018), 141 O.R. (3d) 662,
 O.J. No. 3364, 2018 ONCA 578, at para. 52.
 The Crown’s theory at trial was that Mr. Clark was lying
to protect the appellant. In his cross-examination of Mr. Clark,
the trial Crown sought to establish that Mr. Clark was lying at
trial and on the pre-trial motion, and that he was telling the truth
at the preliminary inquiry. Then, in his closing address, the trial
Crown invited the jury to find, not only that Mr. Clark was lying
at trial, but that he was lying to protect the appellant.
 The appellant submits that the jury should have been told
that they could not draw an adverse inference about the appellant’s guilt from a mere rejection of Mr. Clark’s testimony as not
credible: Soobrian, at p. 613 O.R.; Figliola, at para. 52.
 Clearly, absent evidence of collusion, it was not open to the
jury to infer the appellant’s guilt from Mr. Clark’s dishonesty. Some
of the comments made by the Crown in his closing address may have
left the jury with the impression that they could do so. However, in
light of my disposition of the W. (D.) ground, it is unnecessary to
determine whether the jury charge was deficient on this point.
(5) The use of Mr. Clark and Mr. Akindejoye’s prior consistent
 The appellant contends that the trial judge misled the jury
on the use they could make of Mr. Akindejoye’s prior consistent