10:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m., and (2) eight shots of liquor and one
beer between 10:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m. For scenario (1), the
projected blood alcohol concentration would be 0 to 160 mg of
alcohol in 100 ml of blood when C.R.’s blood was tested. For
scenario (2), the projected blood alcohol concentration would be 0
to 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood. The calculations assumed
full or total absorption of all the alcohol consumed. The CFS noted
that if an individual vomits shortly after consuming alcohol, the
alcohol consumed would likely be expelled from the stomach and
not absorbed into the bloodstream.
 The trial judge found that the significance of the toxicology
finding was questionable given that the samples were collected
almost 24 hours after the events transpired and given the CFS’s
view on the effect of vomiting shortly after consumption: at para.
63. Accordingly, the trial judge found that the absence of alcohol
revealed by the toxicology report did not assist the defence in its
argument that C.R.’s ability to consent to sexual activity was not
impaired by alcohol: at para. 64.
 In dealing with concerns about C.R.’s failure to report the
incident immediately, the trial judge held that delayed disclosure
of improper sexual conduct is not uncommon, especially in circumstances where it involves children or adolescents: at para. 62.
The trial judge was reluctant to impose adult expectations on C.R.
when assessing her conduct the morning following the incident:
at para. 62.
 The trial judge did not consider that C.R.’s evidence was
undermined because she did not call for help during the incident:
at para. 69.
 The accused did not raise a defence of honest but mistaken
belief in communicated consent during closing submissions, likely
because of the dramatically different accounts of what happened
on the part of the complainant, and the accused G.F.
 The trial judge concluded that the appellants forced C.R.
into having non-consensual sex: at para. 71. He then noted that
s. 273.1(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 indicates
that no consent is obtained where the complainant is incapable of
consenting to the activity, such as when a complainant is intoxicated: at para. 72. He found both appellants guilty.
(1) Appellants’ argument that the verdict was unreasonable
 The appellants submit that the coherence of the complainant’s narrative of the events belies the suggestion that she was so
impaired as to lack capacity to consent to sexual relations. In