breach of contract: at para. 38. However, in this part of his
analysis, the trial judge focused exclusively on the materiality or
magnitude of payments made under the Mezzanine CIP in relation to Mr. Manastersky’s overall compensation. He held that
payments under the RBCDS carried interest plans “represented
an integral part of Manastersky’s compensation”: at para. 39.
In the trial judge’s view, “the CIP was a significant, nondiscretionary variable form of compensation that represented more
than half of Manastersky’s annual income, similar to the variable
forms of incentive compensation considered [in Lin]. It was
integral to his compensation and therefore forms part of his
presumptive entitlement to damages at common law during the
notice period”: at para. 41.
 RBCDS submits that although the trial judge correctly
identified the applicable analysis as that set out in Taggart, the
first step of his inquiry incorrectly framed the question to be
asked. Instead of asking what Mr. Manastersky would have
earned in respect of the Mezzanine CIP had RBCDS not breached
the contract of employment, the trial judge wrongfully concluded
that Mr. Manastersky was presumptively entitled to common law
damages in respect of the Mezzanine CIP merely because the
payments under that Plan historically had constituted a significant form of compensation to him. RBCDS contends that the trial
judge erred by failing to ask and answer the proper question
under the first step of the Taggart analysis.
 I am persuaded by this submission.
 A finding that some form of incentive compensation was
an integral part of the employee’s compensation package does not
exhaust the inquiry under the first step of the Taggart analysis.
It only recognizes that a head of damages is available to a terminated employee if he can demonstrate that he would have earned
that form of compensation during the period of reasonable notice.
That commonly occurs, for example, where an employee can point
to a history of receiving annual performance bonuses: see, for
example, Paquette, at para. 7; Singer v. Nordstrong Equipment
Ltd.,  O.J. No. 1988, 2018 ONCA 364, at para. 10.
 It remains the case, however, that when applying the
Taggart approach to a claim for a form of incentive compensation,
a court must inquire into the terms of the incentive compensation
plan, which may contain eligibility criteria or establish a formula
for the calculation of the incentive compensation: Paquette, at
 The first step of the Taggart analysis therefore required
the trial judge to ascertain whether Mr. Manastersky had a common law right to damages for breach of contract in respect of