Management Committee did so. No new Fund 3 Investment
Period was created;
( ii) a participant was granted points in respect “to each Portfolio
relating to a given Investment Period” and those points
represented the Participant’s share of the portion of the
aggregate profits and losses of RBCDS with respect to that
Portfolio: art. 6.1.1;
( iii) any allocation of points in connection with an Investment
Period after the Funds 1 and 2 Investment Periods would be
done by way of a new allocation letter: art. 6.1.3; and
( iv) an employee’s status as a participant in respect to any
Investment Period did not give the participant “the express
or implied right . . . to any Points for any future Investment
Period”: art. 4.4.
 Those provisions, when combined with the decision of the
Management Committee to terminate the Plan, indicate that Mr.
Manastersky was not entitled to any common law damages in
respect of the Mezzanine CIP profit-sharing plan beyond those
relating to his vested points for Funds 1 and 2. The trial judge
erred in law by finding to the contrary because he failed to make
the inquiry mandated by the first step of the Taggart approach.
He incorrectly relied on the magnitude of Mr. Manastersky’s
carried interests under the Mezzanine CIP as a sufficient basis
upon which to find a common law right to further incentive
amounts during the period of reasonable notice.
 The trial judge did address RBCDS’ submission regarding
its ability to terminate the Plan, albeit in the portion of his
reasons dealing with the second step of the Taggart approach.
The trial judge reasoned, at para. 44, that
I do not believe that the fact that RBC had the option of terminating the
Plan at the end of an investment period should be regarded as limiting
Manastersky’s entitlement to notice at common law. First, RBC’s right to
terminate the CIP was in no way tied to the termination of Manastersky’s
employment. Far from containing “clear language” limiting rights upon
termination of employment, the provision in the CIP permitting RBC to
terminate the Plan did not purport to limit or reduce his common law
entitlements. Nor could it be said that the parties did not turn their minds
to the consequences flowing from the termination of Manastersky’s
employment on his entitlements under the CIP. In fact, the CIP enhanced
Manastersky’s entitlements in the event his employment was terminated
without cause, through accelerated vesting of his Points.
 With respect, the trial judge fell into palpable and overriding
error by holding that “the provision in the CIP permitting RBC to