My colleague takes issue with the trial judge’s application
of the Taggart test. He says the trial judge had to consider the
terms of the CIP as part of the first step in the Taggart analysis
in order to determine the respondent’s common law right to
damages, and that he erred in law by failing to do so.
 The argument is that the CIP contains a limit on the
respondent’s common law right to earn CIP during his employment, rather than a limit on his right to a bonus or a pension
following termination, as in Paquette and Taggart. In other
words, because RBC had no obligation to continue the CIP
beyond the two existing funds or to start a third fund, it could not
be said that the respondent would have continued to earn
CIP during his employment or during the reasonable notice
 I agree with my colleague that, as a matter of law, the
terms of the employment contract and the terms of any plan
documents incorporated into the employment contract by
reference — as the CIP was here — are relevant at the first stage
of the Taggart test in determining what the employee would have
earned during the period of reasonable notice: see Paquette,
at para. 18.
 However, as I read his reasons, the trial judge carefully
considered the terms of the CIP in determining whether the
appellant’s right to terminate the CIP prevented that portion of
the respondent’s compensation from forming part of his presumptive entitlement to common law damages. He made two
cogent observations, at para. 44: (1) RBC’s right to terminate the
CIP was in no way tied to the termination of the respondent’s
employment, and (2) that right did not purport to limit or reduce
the respondent’s common law entitlements.
 The trial judge considered the appellant’s argument on
this point fully at the end of his analysis and rejected it. While it
would have been preferable for the trial judge to have addressed
this argument in the part of his reasons where he deals with the
first stage of the Taggart test, read as a whole, the trial judge’s
reasons reveal that he properly considered the terms of the
relevant documents and the applicable law in determining the
respondent’s entitlement to damages.
 Moreover, I disagree with my colleague that the trial
judge made a palpable and overriding error in finding that the
terms of the CIP did not preclude that component of the respondent’s compensation from constituting part of his presumptive
common law right to damages for breach of contract.