reduced by that amount, in this case about 50 per cent. If RBC
had terminated the CIP without offering alternate comparable
compensation, that would have evinced RBC’s intention to no
longer be bound by the employment contract and would have
amounted to constructive dismissal: Potter v. New Brunswick
Legal Aid Services Commission,  1 S.C.R. 500,  S.C.J.
No. 10, 2015 SCC 10, at para. 30.
 My colleague observes, and I agree, that inclusion of
entitlement to the CIP was the product of an agreement between
a sophisticated employer and a group of sophisticated employees.
Had it intended to do so, the sophisticated employer in this case
could have drafted a contractual provision that clearly stated that
if it terminated the CIP, then the employee’s compensation would
be reduced accordingly.
 Further, it is difficult to imagine a sophisticated
employee knowingly agreeing to continue in the position if the
employer could, in its sole discretion, remove over 50 per cent
of the employee’s compensation, especially considering the CIP
was intended to “assist RBC CP in retaining and recruiting
talented individuals to carry out its business objectives”:
reasons, at para. 7.
 I agree with the trial judge that the language of the CIP,
and in particular art. 9.3, does not limit the respondent’s right to
CIP or its equivalent as an integral part of his compensation. The
trial judge did not err in law or commit a palpable and overriding
error in his interpretation of the contract. There is therefore no
basis to interfere with his decision. I would dismiss the appeal
Appeal allowed in part.