The appellant wrote to the Canadian lab storing the embryo
and withdrew his consent to the respondent’s use of the embryo. In
light of that written withdrawal of consent, the lab said that it
would not release the embryo to the respondent without a court
order. Accordingly, the respondent brought a motion seeking an
order permitting her to use the embryo. The motion judge applied
principles of contract and property law to conclude that the
embryo should be released to the respondent for her use. This is
an appeal from that decision. I conclude that neither contract nor
property law principles govern in this case.
 For the reasons that follow, I would allow the appeal. This
decision turns on the interpretation and application of the governing legislation and regulations. In some jurisdictions, where
the state has not regulated in the field of reproductive technology,
private law contract principles apply.1 In Canada, however,
Parliament has imposed a consent-based, rather than a contract-based, model through legislation and regulation. As I will explain,
the correct interpretation and application of the relevant legislative framework determines the result in this case.
 Many provisions of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act,
S.C. 2004, c. 2 (“AHRA”), and the Assisted Human Reproduction
(Section 8 Consent) Regulations, SOR/2007-137 (“Consent Regulations”), are engaged in this decision and discussed in detail later
on.2 The most central are the following: (1) s. 8(3) of the AHRA
prohibits the use of an in vitro embryo for any purpose without
regulation-compliant written consent; (2) s. 10(1)(b) of the Consent
Regulations defines the term “donor” to include a couple who are
spouses at the time the in vitro embryo is created, even where
neither person within the couple contributes reproductive material to the embryo; and (3) s. 14(3) of the Consent Regulations
provides that if the donor is a couple, either spouse may withdraw
consent before the embryo is used.
 For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the parties
together remain the disputed embryo’s “donor” under s. 10(1)(b)
despite their separation and divorce, and, even though they are
no longer married, s. 14(3) allows the appellant to withdraw his
consent to the respondent’s use of the embryo. The appellant’s
1 See Shirley Darby Howell, “The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case
Law, and Proposed State Regulation” (2013), 14:3 DePaul J. Health Care L.
407; Francesco Paolo Busardò, et al., “The Evolution of Legislation in the
Field of Medically Assisted Reproduction and Embryo Stem Cell Research
in European Union Members” (2014), BioMed Res. Int.
2 See Appendix “A” for a complete catalogue.