purchase and sale of in vitro embryos. And s. 8 prohibits the use
of reproductive material and in vitro embryos without consent.
 Section 8(3) of the AHRA and the Consent Regulations
that amplify it lie at the heart of this appeal. Section 8(3) reads:
8(3) No person shall make use of an in vitro embryo for any purpose unless
the donor has given written consent, in accordance with the regulations, to its
use for that purpose.
 While much of the AHRA was struck down as ultra vires
the federal government’s criminal law power, s. 8 of the AHRA
survived that constitutional attack because it falls squarely within Parliament’s power under s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act,
1867 to legislate in the area of criminal law: Reference re AHRA,
at paras. 48-51, 89-92, 110-112, 288-291.3 Accordingly, s. 8(3) constitutes a criminal offence, a conviction for which is accompanied
by a potentially substantial sentence under s. 61 of the AHRA. To
avoid criminality under s. 8(3) of the AHRA, a person who uses
an in vitro embryo must have the prior “written consent” of the
embryo’s “donor”, which consent is provided “in accordance with
 Part 3 of the Consent Regulations that came into effect
after the AHRA was proclaimed in force governs consent for
purposes of s. 8(3) of the AHRA. Neither s. 8(3) of the AHRA nor
the Consent Regulations were considered by the motion judge.
The nub of the parties’ dispute in this court arises from their disagreement over whether those regulations permit the appellant
to withdraw the consent that he provided when the parties were
still married, a consent that specifically granted the respondent
the unilateral right to use the embryo as she wished in the event
of the couple’s divorce.
 Relying upon the principles of statutory interpretation, I
will explain why the provisions, read as a whole, make it clear
that the appellant may withdraw his prior written consent. I will
then go on to explain why the appellant did not contract out of
his right to do so.
(2) The principles of statutory interpretation
 The modern approach to statutory interpretation requires
the court to read the words of a statute “in their entire context
and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with
3 Sections 5 to 7 were conceded to fall within a proper exercise of the federal
government’s s. 91(27) powers.