the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of
Parliament”: see Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re) (1998), 36 O.R.
(3d) 418,  1 S.C.R. 27,  S.C.J. No. 2, at para. 21; Bell
ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex,  2 S.C.R. 559,
 S.C.J. No. 43, 2002 SCC 42, at para. 26, both citing
Elmer A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1983), at 87. A “textual, contextual and purposive
analysis” must be applied to find a meaning that is harmonious
with the entire Act: Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada,
 2 S.C.R. 601,  S.C.J. No. 56, 2005 SCC 54, at para.
10. The subject provisions must be considered within the statute
as a whole.
 Where the relevant provisions are within a regulation,
then the regulation must be read concurrently with, and in the
context of, the enabling legislation: Hickman Motors Ltd.
v. Canada,  2 S.C.R. 336,  S.C.J. No. 62, at para. 37;
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Old Republic
Insurance Co. of Canada (2015), 127 O.R. (3d) 465,  O.J.
No. 5436, 2015 ONCA 699, at para. 68; Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Canada (Attorney General),  1 S.C.R. 533, 
S.C.J. No. 26, 2005 SCC 26, at paras. 37-38. Regulations must
also be interpreted in accordance with the modern principle,
and will generally be interpreted using the same rules and
techniques as statute law, albeit never losing sight of the context
of the enabling provisions that give rise to the regulations that
complete and implement the statutory scheme: Ruth Sullivan,
Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed. (Markham:
LexisNexis, 2014), at §13.18; Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of legislation in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2011),
(3) Applying the principles of statutory interpretation
 Applying the modern principles of statutory interpretation
to the regulatory and statutory scheme as a whole, I conclude
that in the circumstances of this case, the appellant may withdraw his consent to the respondent’s use of the embryo. The
appellant is not bound to his prior written consent, distilled in the
form of an otherwise lawful contract, because the statutory and
regulatory provisions fundamentally preserve a donor’s inherent
right to change her or his mind about in vitro embryo use.
 Four broad considerations lead me to this conclusion:
( i) the critical role that consent plays in the statutory scheme;
( ii)the fact that donor couple status survives separation and
divorce where the former partners have the same genetic
relationship to the embryo (either both are genetically connected