These provisions demonstrate the inextricable link
between donor consent and withdrawal of consent. They eschew
any notion that donor consent becomes crystalized at the moment
it is initially given. Instead, the provisions clearly place donor
consent on a continuum from the time an embryo is created to
the time it is used. In order to extract a fully informed consent, the
donor must be informed that at any point along that continuum,
the donor can change her or his mind by withdrawing consent in
writing. These provisions are entirely consistent with the central
importance of consent in the area of reproductive technology.
 If s. 14(3) were to be interpreted as the respondent
suggests, it would mean that many donors would have provided
their initial consent on the understanding that they could withdraw that consent, only to be told later that they could not do so
because their marital status had changed. Such an approach
would shake the very foundation of the original consent, undermining its voluntary and informed nature. The original consent
would have been extracted on the basis of misinformation.
I would not accept an interpretation of the regulations that would
give rise to that inherently unfair result.
( iv) The plain meaning of s. 1(2)
 This leaves me to address the respondent’s submission
that s. 1(2) of the Consent Regulations specifically deprives the
appellant of the ability to withdraw his consent under s. 14(3)
because he is no longer a “spouse” within the meaning of that
term. I do not agree with the respondent’s interpretation of
s. 1(2) or with the suggestion that it applies to s. 14(3).
 For ease of reference, recall that s. 14(3) applies to donor
couples and allows the “consent of the donor [to be] withdrawn
by either spouse”. Recall also that s. 1(2) removes from the term
“spouse”, “a person who, at the relevant time, lives separate and
apart from the person to whom they are married because of the
breakdown of their marriage”.
 I start by observing that s. 1(2) does not define the term
“spouse”. Rather, it excludes a specific group of people from that
term’s reach: those who are in fact still married but whose
marriages have broken down. In this case, the parties are not
simply living separate and apart and their marriage has not simply
broken down. Rather, they are no longer married. They have not
been married for years. Accordingly, on their plain meaning, the
words of s. 1(2) do not extend to this case.
 This raises the questions, can s. 1(2) be offered an interpretation that exists harmoniously with the context, scheme
and purpose of the AHRA and Consent Regulations and what is