Only in this way do both spouses receive clear protection from
unintended donor couple status.
 By interpreting s. 1(2) in this way, an interpretation that
respects the temporal restriction contained within the provision,
the statute and Consent Regulations work as a harmonious whole.
( v) Conclusion
 Reading the words of the AHRA and the Consent Regulations as a whole, I conclude that s. 14(3) must be read as
permitting either person within a donor couple to withdraw their
consent to in vitro embryo use. The use of the term “spouse” in
s. 14(3) was not intended to preclude divorced spouses, who
together still constitute a donor couple, from withdrawing their
consent. Rather, considering s. 14(3) in the context of the other
provisions, and against the overarching importance of ongoing
and fully informed consent in the statutory and regulatory
scheme, I conclude that, regardless of one’s changed marital
status, while donor status continues, so too does the right to
withdraw consent. The use of the term “spouse” in s. 14(3) is,
therefore, nothing more than a short-hand way in which to make
clear that either party within the donor couple — a donor couple
that survives divorce in a case like this — may withdraw their
(4) The parties could not contract out of the s. 14(3) right to
withdraw consent prior to use
 The respondent maintains that, even if the Consent Regulations permit someone in the appellant’s position to withdraw
consent, the appellant contracted out of that right when he
signed the Ontario contract. The appellant agreed in the Ontario
contract that, in the event of divorce, the respondent’s “wishes”
about embryo use would be respected. The respondent says that
this court should hold him to that contract.
 Consent in the legislative context involving reproductive
technology is fundamentally at odds with contract law. The first
permits unilateral changes of heart that the second precludes.
The very essence of s. 8(3) of the AHRA and the Consent Regulations is to allow for an individual’s right to consent, a right that is
inherently linked to respect for the consenter’s state of mind. It
would undermine the notion of consent embodied in the AHRA
and the Consent Regulations to freeze it at a specific moment in
time and preclude changes of mind, changes that may arise from
changed life circumstances inherent to the human condition.
 Section 8 of the AHRA reflects deep societal respect for
donor consent in the context of reproductive technology. Indeed,