in original]. The fact that the Plan does not provide for equity
holders to benefit from the Litigation Trust thus follows the
priorities set by the CCAA for the distribution of recoveries from
the enforcement of an SFC asset.
 It would be contrary to the purpose of the Plan, and the
Litigation Trust it provided for, to give the release of SFC under
the Plan the effect for which the appellant contends. The Litigation
Trust was a vehicle to allow recoveries from persons whose conduct caused damage to SFC. The appellant’s argument would
treat the Plan as effectively having released him from being pursued for causing that damage, something the Plan did not do.
( iv) The double recovery doctrine does not apply
 The appellant argues that the trial judge’s assessment of
damages creates the risk of double recovery from him. He argues
that a judgment against him should not issue because “a defendant
cannot be liable twice for the same alleged loss”. Reduced to its
bare essentials, the appellant’s position is that the funds raised by
SFC on the debt and capital markets are at the core of both the
claims in the Class Actions and the award of damages in this
action. Even if separate causes of action and rights to damages
exist, the damages award in this action will undoubtedly overlap
with what may be awarded against him in the Class Actions.
 I would not give effect to this argument. Since SFC has
a separate and distinct cause of action and suffered a recognizable
form of loss, neither the cause of action nor recovery for it can be
defeated by an argument that the appellant’s conduct also gave
rise to causes of action in others who may seek to claim their own
damages from him, even if in similar amounts.
 The appellant invokes the rule against double recovery,
but his position does not attract the rule, properly understood.
The rule does not prevent a party with a claim from obtaining
a judgment for 100 per cent of its losses. The rule only prevents a
party who has made a recovery on a judgment from recovering,
through other actions, more than 100 per cent of those losses. “It
is not the damage award that amounts to satisfaction and bars
a second action but the recovery by the plaintiff in the first
action”: Treaty Group Inc. (c.o.b. Leather Treaty) v. Drake International Inc. (2007), 86 O.R. (3d) 366,  O.J. No. 2468, 2007
ONCA 450, at para. 13 (emphasis in original). The rule has no
application here, where it is raised to avoid judgment against the