APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the judgment of Akbarali J.,
 O.J. No. 2001, 2018 ONSC 1365 (S.C.J.).
R. Donald Rollo and Dean Melamed, for appellants.
David A. Tompkins and Trevor J. Buckley, for respondent.
The judgment of the court was delivered by
HOURIGAN J.A.: —
 The appellants commenced two actions claiming insurance
coverage under a commercial insurance policy issued by the
respondent. That policy covers “direct loss from any Peril”, including business interruption loss and loss of property due to
theft or wrongful handling. The first action seeks indemnification
for lost rental income and a bonus of $950,000 alleged to be owing
to the appellant Mario Parravano (the “First Action”). The second action seeks indemnification for the alleged theft or wrongful
handling of certain equipment and related business interruption
losses (the “Second Action”).
 The two actions were tried together in a bifurcated, coverage-only trial. The trial judge dismissed the First Action in its
entirety. In the Second Action, the trial judge dismissed the property
claim, but permitted the business interruption claim to proceed in
part. The appellants appeal the dismissal of the First Action and
their property claim (as well as part of their business interruption
claim) in the Second Action. The respondent cross-appeals the
decision of the trial judge permitting the business interruption
claim to proceed in part.
 These reasons explain why I would dismiss the appeal and
allow the cross-appeal. In summary, the trial judge made no error
in dismissing the First Action because she correctly found that the
claims were not for direct losses covered by the policy. The trial
judge was also correct in dismissing the property claim in the
Second Action as time-barred by the terms of the policy. However,
the cross-appeal must be allowed because the trial judge erred in
finding that the business interruption claim was subject to a rolling
 Mr. Parravano and his non-party wife own all the corporate
appellants directly or indirectly. In October 1999, a plant operated
by a corporation affiliated with the appellants that produced baked
goods and cereal bars suffered an Indian meal moth infestation.
This infestation affected the production of cereal bars.