I am not persuaded by this submission. It is not a fair
reading of the trial judge’s reasons to conclude that she considered
that there could be only one proximate cause. Indeed, the trial
judge specifically cited case law wherein concurrent causes of
damages were considered: Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. v.
Prudential Assurance Co.,  O.J. No. 657, 14 D.L.R. (2d) 7
(C.A.), affd  S.C.R. 539,  S.C.J. No. 32;
Sherwin-Williams Co. of Canada v. Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. of
Canada,  S.C.R. 187,  S.C.J. No. 52. Relying on Ford,
she stated at para. 30 that, “the cause of the loss or damage
covered by the contracts must be a ‘proximate cause’” (emphasis
added). Clearly, the trial judge understood that there could be
more than one proximate cause of a direct loss.
 The appellants also argue that it is irrelevant that other
insured parties received insurance moneys because under the
policy they have a right to be treated severally and not jointly. In
the appellants’ submission, the infestation, which was a covered
peril, led to the eventual bankruptcy of the Bakemates Group of
Companies. Due to the bankruptcy, they argue, those parties were
unable to meet their financial obligations and the appellants
therefore suffered direct losses.
 The trial judge correctly rejected this argument and found
that the losses alleged to have been suffered were the result of the
failure of Bakemates Group of Companies to meet their financial
obligations and not the infestation. This finding was amply
supported by the record, including evidence that the Bakemates
Group of Companies’ sales actually increased after the infestation. I would therefore not give effect to this argument.
(b) Damages principle
 In analyzing the issue of whether the claims were direct
losses, the trial judge referenced the fact that the Bakemates
Group of Companies have already recovered their business interruption losses. She stated that to permit the appellants to also
recover for business interruption losses would amount to a “double
recovery”. The appellants seize upon this statement and argue that
the trial judge erred in law by considering a damages principle in
a coverage-only trial.
 I reject this submission. Read fairly, the trial judge’s
reference to double recovery was part of a proper analysis to
ensure that her interpretation of the policy does not “give rise
to results that are unrealistic or that the parties would not have
contemplated in the commercial atmosphere in which the
insurance policy was contracted”: Ledcor Construction Ltd.