The trial judge’s finding related to the claim for business
interruption losses forms the basis for a ground of appeal and the
cross-appeal. The entirety of her analysis on this issue is as follows
[at paras. 60-63]:
For the reasons set out above, the second claim, being the claim for business
interruption losses, commenced latest on the day the sale to Amore Sweets
closed. It was at that time that the plaintiffs knew or had the means of ac-
quiring the knowledge that they had a claim for business interruption losses
arising out of the loss of their property.
However, a claim for business interruption losses is, by its nature, an ongoing
claim. As the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal stated in Treeland Motor Inn Ltd.
v. Western Assurance Co., 1985 CarswellSask 165 (Sask C.A.) at para. 4, the
alleged interruption of the plaintiffs’ business might have commenced with
a particular event (in that case, a fire; in this case, the closing of the sale to
Amore Sweets) “but continued to accrue from day to day thereafter, and cannot
therefore be said to have ‘occurred’ on the day of the event which triggered it”.
In effect, the plaintiffs’ business interruption claim is subject to a rolling
limitation period. A new claim accrues each day for the business losses
sustained that day. I thus conclude that the plaintiffs’ claim for business
interruption (to the extent it can be proven in the next phase of this trial)
beginning one year before the commencement of the second action is not out
of time — that is, the business interruption losses suffered commencing
November 16, 2001 are not barred by reason of the contractual limitation
period. To the extent the plaintiffs seek recovery for business interruption
losses they suffered before November 16, 2001, those claims were not
advanced within the contractual limitation period and are therefore barred.
In conclusion on this issue, the claims for business interruption losses
beginning one year before the commencement of the second action are not
barred by the contractual limitation period. The other claims advanced in the
second action are barred.
 It is clear from the foregoing that the trial judge found
that, for both property and business interruption claims, the
appellants knew or had the means of knowing as of the closing of
the sale that they might have a claim under the policy. However,
because a claim for business losses is “on-going in nature”, the
trial judge concluded that it is subject to a rolling limitation period.
Turning first to the cross-appeal, the issue for determination is
whether the trial judge erred in law in reaching that conclusion.
For the following reasons, I conclude that she did.
 I start my analysis of this issue with the case relied on by
the trial judge, Treeland Motor Inn Ltd. v. Western Assurance Co.,
 S.J. No. 209, 37 Sask. R. 289 (C.A.). It was an oral
endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan consisting
of five paragraphs, in a situation where the limitation period was
missed by one day. The policy in issue provided [at para. 1]:
“Every action or proceeding against the insurer for the recovery
of any claim under or by virtue of this contract shall be absolutely