In Richards v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 
O.J. No. 4574, 2016 ONSC 5492,  I.L.R. I-5911 (S.C.J.), at
para. 26, Bale J. distinguished between cases where the plaintiff
is entitled to periodic payments and cases where the plaintiff’s
entitlement to periodic payment is in issue:
A rolling limitation period may apply to claims for periodic payments, in
cases where the issue is whether certain payments to which the plaintiff is
entitled have been made (e.g. payments of rent), as opposed to cases where
the issue is whether the plaintiff was entitled to the periodic payments in the
first place. In the former type of case, the material facts will have arisen on
a periodic basis, and it will not be unfair to require a defendant to litigate those
facts during the applicable limitation period following the date upon which an
individual payment became due. However, in the latter type of case, the material
facts will have arisen at the time that the plaintiff alleges he or she first became
entitled to periodic payments, and it would be unfair to require the defendant to
litigate those facts, for a potentially unlimited period of time.
 In my view, where the trial judge erred was in focusing her
analysis on the question of whether the appellants were continuing
to suffer damages rather than on the issue of whether the respondent had a recurring contractual obligation. Unlike Pickering
Square, where the tenant had a recurring obligation to occupy the
premises every month during the term of the lease, the respondent was not obliged to make recurring payments. Rather, the
policy covered business interruption losses and the respondent
was obliged to pay those losses in their totality, subject to any
limits in the policy. The fact that there was a 24-month cap on the
business interruption losses does not convert the respondent’s
obligation to indemnify into a recurring contractual obligation.
Therefore, this was not a proper case for the application of
a rolling limitation period.
 The appellants knew as of the closing date for the sale of
the businesses that they no longer had the assets under their control and that consequently they would thereafter suffer business
interruption losses. While the precise amount of the damages was
unknown, the appellants knew at that point that they had suffered loss or damage and under the policy they were obliged to
commence a claim within one year. The fact that the extent of
damages may not be known with precision does not stop the
commencement of the limitation period: Peixeiro v. Haberman,
 3 S.C.R. 549,  S.C.J. No. 31, at para. 18. The Second
Action was consequently time-barred in its entirety.
 Based on the foregoing, I would dismiss the appeal and
allow the cross-appeal in relation to the Second Action.