5(1) The court shall certify a class proceeding on a motion under section
2, 3 or 4 if,
(a) the pleadings or the notice of application discloses a cause of action;
(b) there is an identifiable class of two or more persons that would be
represented by the representative plaintiff or defendant;
(c) the claims or defences of the class members raise common issues;
(d) a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure for the resolu-
tion of the common issues; and
(e) there is a representative plaintiff or defendant who,
( i) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,
( ii) has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable
method of advancing the proceeding on behalf of the class and
of notifying class members of the proceeding, and
( iii) does not have, on the common issues for the class, an interest
in conflict with the interests of other class members.
 This is an easy claim to certify.
 Except for the cause of action requirement, the plaintiff
need only demonstrate that there is “some basis in fact” for each
of the certification requirements: Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd.
v. Microsoft Corp.,  3 S.C.R. 477,  S.C.J. No. 57, para.
99. “Thus the certification stage is decidedly not meant to be a
test of the merits of the action . . . Rather the certification stage
focuses on the form of the action”: Hollick v. Toronto (City), 
3 S.C.R. 158,  S.C.J. No. 67, para. 16. The question in this
part of the double motion is not whether the plaintiff’s claim is
legally sound, but whether it can proceed as a class action.
 The causes of action pleaded are all feasible under the circumstances. The test to be applied here is the same as in a motion
under rule 21.01(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure — that is,
accepting the facts as pleaded as true, is there a cause or more than
one cause of action that can be sustained in the statement of
claim. The plaintiff’s claim alleges causes of action in breach
of contract, breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty, all arising
out of calculation and “rounding” dispute in interpreting the Bell
Canada pension plan.
 The ingredients of each have been properly pleaded; and
while the merits of the claims will be discussed below in the context of the summary judgment motion, these causes of action are
well known legal bases for challenging a pension plan. Indeed,
they have formed the basis of claims certified in similar cases on
behalf of members of pension plans: see Mortson v. Ontario
Municipal Employees Retirement Board,  O.J. No. 4338,
 O. T.C. 920 (S.C.J.), para. 37; Kranjcec v. Ontario (2004), 69