(=0.90 per cent). Accordingly, the greater figure of 1 per cent was
used for pensioners such as the plaintiff who are 65 and over.
 For those few pensioners under 65, the rate of indexation
is stipulated in s. 8.7( iv) as 100 per cent of the Pension Index for
the year rounded to the nearest whole number, to a maximum of
2 per cent under s. 8.7( i). Since the 2017 Pension Index came to 1
per cent, the rate employed by Bell for the under 65 pensioners
was also 1 per cent.
 The defendants adduced an affidavit by Robert Marchessault, the director of pension and actuarial services for Bell
Canada Enterprises, who went through the calculations for the
benefit of the court record. One interesting observation made by
Mr. Marchessault is that the calculation required under s. 8.7( ii)(a)
for arriving at the annual indexation for pensioners aged 65 and
older — i.e., 60 per cent of the Pension Index for the year — will
never yield more than a two decimal place figure if you use only
a one decimal place annual increase as Statistics Canada (and the
plaintiff) does. Mr. Marchessault states that it is “mathematically
impossible” to go to three or more decimal places when calculating
60 per cent of a one decimal place percentage.
 There is no evidence that contradicts this statement of
 Thus, an approach using the Statistics Canada one-decimal
rounding of the CPI rate, would eliminate the need for any further
rounding as set out in s. 8.7( ii). It would also render meaningless
the provision in s. 8.7( iv) that all rounding be to two decimal places.
 On the other hand, if you take the CPI rate as calculated by
Statistics Canada and round it to two decimal places to arrive at the
annual Pension Index, and then plug this figure into the 60 per cent
calculation in s. 8.7( ii)(a), the scheme makes more sense. As Mr.
Marchessault explains, you will then most often arrive at an outcome of three decimal places, and will have to round it down to two
decimal places under s. 8.7( iv). This approach is the only one that
gives s. 8.7( iv) any real meaning.
 Counsel for the defendants submits that “[t]he court
should strive to give meaning to the agreement and ‘reject an
interpretation that would render one of its terms ineffective’”:
Scanlon v. Castlepoint Development Corp. (1992), 11 O.R. (3d)
744,  O.J. No. 2692 (C.A.), para. 89, quoting National Trust
Co. v. Mead,  2 S.C.R. 410,  S.C.J. No. 76, at p. 425
S.C.R. It is hard to argue against this logic.
 Regardless of the existence of general policies favouring
employees/pensioners and doctrines of contract interpretation
favouring the non-drafting party, there is no rule of interpretation
that would implement a version of the Plan that renders it partly