money from the public and incur obligations to lenders and others
that it would not otherwise have incurred, and SFC’s funds,
received through these activities, that were invested and lost in
illegitimate businesses or consumed by the consequence of the
discovery of the fraud. Leaving aside the question of how damages
for these matters are assessed, the causes of action to sue for
them were Causes of Action of SFC.
 The Plan transferred to the Litigation Trust Causes of
Action “that have been or may be asserted by or on behalf of . . .
SFC against any and all third parties . . .”, a term which would
include the appellant: s. 1.1. The appellant’s contention could only
be correct if there were something in the Plan that restricted the
meaning that would otherwise be given to that transfer language.
The provision of the Plan relied upon by the appellant for this
effect is the “greater certainty” clause in the definition of Litigation
Trust Claims, which reads as follows: “For greater certainty: ( x)
the claims being advanced or that are subsequently advanced in
the Class Actions are not being transferred to the Litigation Trust;
and (y) the claims being transferred to the Litigation Trust shall
not be advanced in the Class Actions.” Like the trial judge, I do not
read that phrase to have the meaning for which the appellant argues.
 First, as the trial judge correctly noted, the claims made in
the Class Actions are claims made on behalf of noteholders and
equity holders for their causes of action arising from damages
they suffered. SFC did not make claims in the Class Actions
asserting SFC Causes of Action or seeking damages SFC suffered.
The distinction is important and is not undermined by either the
factual overlap in the claims or the fact that certain creditors are
or may be both beneficiaries of the Litigation Trust and members
of the plaintiff classes.
 On the point of factual overlap, the same or similar facts
may give rise to a cause of action by a shareholder and one by the
corporation. The law recognizes that “. . . where a shareholder
has been directly and individually harmed, that shareholder may
have a personal cause of action even though the corporation may
also have a separate and distinct cause of action” (emphasis added):
Hercules, at para. 62. Shareholders and noteholders may have
causes of action arising from misrepresentations made to them
when acquiring securities, based on common law doctrines or under
securities legislation. And where they do, they may have rights to
sue for damages they personally have suffered. But the existence
of those causes of action does not detract from the existence of
a separate and distinct cause of action of the corporation, based
on wrongdoing against or breach of duties owed to it, to sue for
damages it has suffered.