transferred to the entity that held them. The “greater certainty”
language in this definition must be read in the same way. The fact
that the causes of action of shareholders’ and noteholders’
advanced in the Class Actions were not transferred to the Litigation
Trust under the Plan has no bearing on the transfer of SFC’s
separate and distinct Causes of Action to the Litigation Trust, even
if arising from the same or similar facts and even though creditors
are beneficiaries of the Litigation Trust. SFC’s Causes of Action
were not being advanced in the Class Actions. The “greater
certainty” language consequently does not have the effect for
which the appellant contends.
 Stepping back from the precise wording of the Plan, the
appellant argues more generally that it represented a bargain
that his wrongs would be pursued in the Class Actions only. I do
not accept this argument, which does not find support in the text
of the Plan, read in light of the factual matrix and the purposes of
the Plan and the CCAA.
 The Class Actions pre-dated the Plan. If they were intended
to be the sole vehicle for recovery from the appellant, it is unclear
why the appellant did not receive a release from SFC or the Litigation Trust under the Plan. Moreover, when the Plan was put
forward and approved, the failed sales process had already established that recoveries from assets in SFC subsidiaries would be
insufficient to allow SFC to satisfy creditor claims, making other
sources of recovery, including enforcement of SFC’s litigation
rights, important. There is no reason why rights of action of SFC
against the appellant, which would continue to exist in a bankruptcy or liquidation of SFC, would be given up in this CCAA
Plan, where the object was to maximize recoveries in a manner
more advantageous than bankruptcy or liquidation. Moreover, the
stated purpose of the Plan includes allowing creditors to benefit
from the pursuit of contingent claims by the Litigation Trust.
Morawetz J., in granting the sanction order approving the Plan,
noted that it provided the opportunity “through the Litigation
Trust, to pursue (in litigation or settlement) those parties that are
alleged to share some or all of the responsibility for the problems
that led SFC to file for CCAA protection”: Sino-Forest Corp. (Re),
at para. 64. When the Plan was approved, the appellant was
already alleged to be one of those persons, but on the appellant’s
argument the opportunity Morawetz J. identified would not exist.
 The purposes of the CCAA and the Plan, and the Plan’s
precise provisions read in light of the factual matrix, all rebut the
appellant’s characterization of the Plan as preventing the Litigation Trust from pursuing a claim that SFC could have pursued
against the appellant for his misconduct.