was it appropriate to consider them as caused by the appellant’s
 The appellant submits that the core of the claim is for
losses incurred by debt and equity holders and that the amounts
raised from them, if acquired by fraud as the respondent alleges,
never belonged to SFC and therefore could not form part of SFC’s
loss. He argues that allowing such a claim improperly creates the
risk of double recovery.
 The appellant goes on to submit that the trial judge
simply presumed the appellant to have caused everything that led
to SFC’s ultimate collapse. He argues that the trial judge should
have: required proof that each transaction that occurred would
not have occurred without the appellant’s deceit; calculated, for
each transaction so found, the loss resulting from it and; accounted
for transactions on which there was no loss.
 Finally, he argues that the trial judge applied incorrect
principles of damages assessment. The Steger primary approach
should have been completely rejected in favour of a transaction-by-transaction analysis. Even the specific loss analysis that the
trial judge performed is flawed as it would, in part, award SFC
damages which could only have been suffered by its subsidiaries.
 For the reasons that follow, I would not give effect to the
appellant’s principal causation and damages arguments or disturb
the trial judge’s award of damages. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to
address the appellant’s arguments about whether and how the
trial judge’s alternative damages calculation should be adjusted.
(b) The standard of review
 Causation is a question of fact, and is reviewed on
a deferential standard. Absent palpable and overriding error,
appellate intervention is not warranted: Ediger v. Johnston,
 2 S.C.R. 98,  S.C.J. No. 18, 2013 SCC 18, at para. 29.
 A trial judge’s assessment of damages attracts considerable
deference. It will not be interfered with absent an error of principle
or law, a misapprehension of evidence, a showing that there was
no evidence on which the trial judge could have reached his or her
conclusion, a failure to consider relevant factors or consideration
of irrelevant factors, or a palpably incorrect or wholly erroneous
assessment of damages: Naylor Group Inc. v. Ellis-Don Construction
Ltd.,  2 S.C.R. 943,  S.C.J. No. 56, 2001 SCC 58, at
para. 80; Rougemount Capital Inc. v. Computer Associates International Inc.,  O.J. No. 5786, 2016 ONCA 847, 410 D.L.R.
(4th) 509, at para. 41.