assets”, as the trial judge found, the funds would have been
impressed with a trust in favour of the shareholders and noteholders who advanced the funds. Only they, not SFC, would have
a right to claim for the loss of these funds. Moreover, allowing
a claim for these funds would involve SFC in inconsistent positions
— complaining that funds were obtained on its behalf through
fraud while trying to obtain the benefit of those very funds.
 In making the latter argument, the appellant relies on
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Corporation Agencies
Ltd. v. Home Bank of Canada,  S.C.R. 706,  S.C.J.
No. 49. In that case, an individual engaged in a fraudulent cheque
kiting scheme, making unauthorized deposits into Corporation
Agencies’ bank account followed by equally unauthorized withdrawals. Corporation Agencies sued the bank alleging it should not
have honoured the unauthorized withdrawals. Success on that
claim would have given it the benefit of the unauthorized deposits.
 In rejecting the claim, the majority of Supreme Court
held, at p. 726 S.C.R., that the plaintiff could not accept part of
the fraudulent scheme — the part that saw money deposited to
its account — while relying on the fraud to dispute withdrawals
that had been made pursuant to the same fraudulent scheme.
 In my view, this case does not assist the appellant because
it is distinguishable on two fundamental points. Corporation
Agencies was suing a party who was not the perpetrator of the
fraud and was seeking to benefit from part of the fraud at that
party’s expense. Here, the claim is not against an innocent party,
but against the perpetrator, for damages caused by the fraudulent
scheme. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision precludes that
type of claim. Moreover, in Corporation Agencies, the plaintiff did
not establish that the moneys deposited into its account were
funds for which it would have to account to others: at p. 726
S.C.R. Here, SFC had obligations in respect of the funds raised on
the capital markets, which the appellant’s fraud deprived it of the
ability to meet.
 I do not have to decide if the appellant’s trust characterization is correct, as it does not support his position. The trial
judge found that SFC had suffered damage because it raised
money on the capital markets, incurred obligations to its shareholders and noteholders by doing so, and then lost the money
raised, none of which would have occurred but for the appellant’s
misconduct. The result was to leave SFC with the obligations it
took on when it raised the funds while depriving it of the means
to honour those obligations.
 This analysis would not change if the moneys raised
were, as the appellant argues, “impressed with a trust in favour