acknowledge that the issues in these proceedings engage any Charter rights
of patients. Accordingly, the objective of the alternatives proposed by the
Applicants is the preservation of the Charter rights of religious physicians to
the extent necessary to avoid participation in the services to which they
object. The significance for present purposes, where the issue is whether the
means chosen impair the right no more than is necessary to achieve the
objective of patient access to health care, and in particular the objective of
equitable access to health care, is that the Applicants have failed to establish
that their proposed alternatives are directed toward this objective, much less
that such objective could be achieved on the basis of less impairing means.
 I have quoted these extracts from the Divisional Court’s
reasons at some length because they include findings of fact that
are firmly rooted in the evidence. The appellants have not demonstrated any error in these findings. In my view, they are fatal to the
appellants’ submissions on the issue of minimal impairment.
 As I have noted, the appellants advance what they now
call a “generalized information” model as a less impairing alternative, which they claim meets the College’s objective. They
acknowledge, however, that “generalized information” is essentially a different label for what they described as “self-referral” in
the Divisional Court, and which the Divisional Court rejected.
This model would permit physicians to provide patients with
information concerning resources, such as the CCS or Telehealth,
to enable patients to locate a non-objecting physician who would
provide abortion, MAiD, or other services. They say this is
a reasonable and less drastic alternative to an effective referral.
 The College argues that the appellants’ “generalized
information” model is flawed because it does not respond to the
realities of the vulnerable patient population and will not achieve
the objective of equitable access to health care. The “generalized
information” model places the burden on the patient to self-refer
to find a physician who will provide the health care they seek. As
discussed earlier, this may result in delay in obtaining time-sensitive medical services or it may foreclose access to care
altogether. One can reasonably anticipate that the loss of the personal support of a trusted physician would leave the patient with
feelings of rejection, shame and stigma. Left to their own devices
when he or she most needs personal support and advice, the
patient would be left to negotiate the health system armed with
brochures, telephone numbers and websites.
 The issue of shame and stigma is not theoretical. One of
the individual appellants was asked on cross-examination what
she would do if a patient came to her office seeking an abortion.
The physician in question has a sign posted in her office telling
patients that she will not refer for abortions or assist in obtaining
an abortion, and will not assist with other “‘medical’ practices”