policy choice, one which the College, as a self-governing professional
body with institutional expertise in developing policies and procedures governing the practice of medicine, was in a better position
to make than a court: M. v. H.,  2 S.C.R. 3,  S.C.J. No.
23, at paras. 78-79; and Green v. Law Society of Manitoba, 
1 S.C.R. 360,  S.C.J. No. 20, 2017 SCC 20, at para. 25. The
College was uniquely qualified to craft the Policies in a manner
sensitive to the conditions of the practice of medicine in Ontario:
Trinity Western, at para. 37. Courts must be cautious not to overstep the bounds of their institutional competence in reviewing
such decisions. Often, as in this case, the proper course of judicial
conduct is to afford a measure of deference to the College’s
judgment: Wynberg v. Ontario (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 561, 
O.J. No. 2732 (C.A.), at para. 184, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused
 S.C.C.A. No. 441; and Carter, at paras. 97-98.
 There is more, however. The fundamental problem with
the appellants’ proposed alternative model is the same as identified
by the majority of the Supreme Court in Hutterian Brethren. The
Hutterian claimants objected to having their photographs taken,
which the province required in order to hold a driver’s licence.
The province, which was concerned about the misuse of drivers’
licences for identity theft, proposed that those who objected on
religious grounds could have their photographs held in a central
photo bank. The claimants proposed instead that their licences
could be stamped, “Not to be used for identification purposes.”
The Supreme Court observed, at paras. 57-60, that the deficiency
in the claimants’ proposal was that it compromised the province’s
objective of minimizing the risk of misuse of drivers’ licences for
identify theft. The proposal, “instead of asking what is minimally
required to realize the legislative goal, asks the government to
significantly compromise it”: Hutterian Brethren, at para. 60.
Accordingly, the alternative proposed by the Hutterian claimants
was not appropriate for consideration at the minimal impairment
stage of the analysis.
 The same is true here. The alternatives proposed by the
appellants and some of the intervenors are directed to minimizing
the burden of the Policies on objecting physicians, not to advancing
the goal of equitable access to abortion, MAiD, contraception and
sexual and reproductive health care. The appellants’ alternatives
would compromise the College’s goal, because they would require
already vulnerable patients to attempt to navigate the health
care system on their own, without any direct personal assistance
from their physicians, whom they entrust to act as their
navigators for health care services. This would impair equitable
access to health care.