claimants disproportionate to the government’s objective?” At
para. 76, she explained the utility of this stage of the Oakes
It may be questioned how a law which has passed the rigours of the first
three stages of the proportionality analysis — pressing goal, rational con-
nection, and minimum impairment — could fail at the final inquiry of
proportionality of effects. The answer lies in the fact that the first three
stages of Oakes are anchored in an assessment of the law’s purpose. Only the
fourth branch takes full account of the “severity of the deleterious effects of
a measure on individuals or groups”.
 She observed, at para. 85, that the proponent of the
measures is not required to produce positive proof that the measure
will be beneficial and that it is enough to show by reason and
evidence that it will be.
Salutary and deleterious effects
 Prior to engaging in the balancing process, the Divisional
Court identified the salutary and deleterious effects of the effective referral requirements of the Policies. I have mentioned these
above. In broad overview, the requirements enhance equitable
access to MAiD, abortion and other services and reduce or
eliminate barriers, delays, anxiety and stigmatization of vulnerable
patients in circumstances in which their physicians object to the
services on grounds of religion or conscience.
 The deleterious effects of the requirements for objecting
physicians are the burden and anxiety associated with a choice
between their deeply-held religious beliefs and complicity in acts
which they regard as sinful. For some objecting physicians, but
not all, the options set out in the Fact Sheet are not compatible
with their beliefs and they are faced with the additional burdens
of choosing between leaving the field of medicine in which they
practise, leaving Ontario to practice elsewhere, or leaving the
practice of medicine altogether.
 The Divisional Court noted that three contextual considerations are relevant to the proportionality analysis. First, the
right of patients to equitable access to lawful and provincially
funded health care services engages a s. 7 Charter right of
patients. This observation signals that in the proportionality
analysis, the court must consider not only the Charter rights and
freedoms of objecting physicians, but also the interests of patients.
 Second, the Divisional Court observed that physicians
have no right to practice medicine, let alone a constitutionally
protected right to do so. Third, it noted that Ontario physicians