mother was of Mi’kmiq heritage and a member of the Millbrook
First Nations in Nova Scotia. The appellant was adopted by his
adoptive parents when he was five months old and, while the
appellant was young, they moved to Toronto. The appellant had
four siblings and a normal family life. As a young child, a non-Indigenous uncle exposed him to sweat lodge and smudging
ceremonies, and to hunting, fishing and trapping.
 When the appellant travelled to Nova Scotia to visit N.R.
in 2009, he also met his biological mother. He was 33 years of age
at the time. He told the author of the Gladue report that he was
interested in reconnecting with his Indigenous roots. During his
detention at the Elgin Middlesex Detention Centre, while he
was awaiting sentencing in this case, the appellant attended an
Indigenous cultural program called “Native Sons”.
C. The Decision Below
 In his reasons on the Crown application to declare the
appellant a dangerous offender, the sentencing judge explained
that he had adopted the approach of this court in R. v. Szostak
(2014), 118 O.R. (3d) 401,  O.J. No. 95, 2014 ONCA 15, leave
to appeal to S.C.C. refused  S.C.C.A. No. 300. Pursuant to
Szostak, the issue to be decided at the designation stage was
whether, based on the evidence led, including expert evidence, the
appellant’s past conduct established beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing a failure to restrain
his behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or injury to
other persons, or inflicting severe psychological damage on
other persons, through failure in the future to restrain his
behaviour (s. 753(1)(a)( i)); or
(2) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour showing a sub-
stantial degree of indifference on his part respecting the
reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of his
behaviour (s. 753(1)(a)( ii)).
 In Szostak, the court explained that the intractability of
the offending conduct was only considered at the second step
of the analysis, when the court made the decision as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed pursuant to ss. 753(4) and (4.1).
 The sentencing judge concluded that the criteria to designate
the appellant as a dangerous offender had been made out. He then
moved to the penalty stage. The sentencing judge was satisfied that
there was a reasonable expectation that a determinate sentence
coupled with a long-term supervision order would not adequately
protect the public. He found that he was unable to act on