The sentencing judge’s finding that there was no reasonable
prospect of control of the appellant in the community at the penalty
stage can therefore be relied on at the designation stage.
 Second, and more importantly, from my review of the
reasons, it is apparent that the sentencing judge did not improperly
place an onus on the appellant. The evidence supporting a finding
of intractability was overwhelming.
 The clinical and actuarial assessments established that the
appellant posed a moderate to high risk for violent or sexual
recidivism. The appellant’s substance abuse disorder exacerbated
this risk. It served to inhibit his judgment and empathy. The
appellant’s antisocial personality disorder and his significant
psychopathic traits suggested that he would be less responsive to
treatment and more likely to refuse or discontinue treatment, all
of which increases the likelihood that he would reoffend.
 While in the penitentiary, the appellant showed no signs of
insight or willingness to engage in a corrective plan. While there
were signs of optimism because of his conduct at the Elgin
Middlesex Detention Centre, the sentencing judge determined
that this evidence amounted only to a possibility of eventual control in the community, not a reasonable expectation of such control.
 The sentencing judge assessed all of the evidence and was
satisfied that there was no reasonable expectation that anything
other than an indeterminate sentence would adequately protect
the public. This conclusion that there was no reasonable expectation of controlling the appellant’s offending behaviour was
necessarily premised on the sentencing judge’s finding that the
appellant’s harmful recidivism and violent pattern of behaviour
was intractable. This finding of fact is fully supported by the
evidence led by the Crown and, as explained by the sentencing
judge, is anchored in his acceptance of Dr. Woodside’s opinion.
The sentencing judge explained that “‘the convergence’ of the
two diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder and substance
abuse disorder makes it unrealistic to expect for Mr. Gracie his
control in the community”. A mere hope of control is simply not
enough to raise a reasonable doubt in this case.
(2) The Gladue error
(a) The impact of the Gladue factors
 The sentencing judge’s reasons do not reference the Gladue
report and Gladue principles. The appellant submits that the
sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the fact that he is
Indigenous. He argues that his Indigenous background may have
played a role in his offending and the possibility of his accessing