contraception, fertility treatments and medical treatments for
 None of the parties dispute that the Charter applies to the
Policies. The College says the Charter applies, not because it is
a state actor and not because the Policies are laws, but rather
because it is implementing a specific government objective through
the Policies: Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General),
 3 S.C.R. 624,  S.C.J. No. 86, at paras. 44, 50-51.
 The Policies are not “regulations”, nor are they a “code,
standard or guideline relating to standards of practice of the profession” adopted pursuant to s. 95(1.1) of the Health Professions
Procedural Code, Schedule 2 of the RHPA. Accordingly,
non-compliance with the Policies is not an act of professional misconduct under the College’s professional misconduct regulation:
Professional Misconduct, O. Reg. 856/93.
 However, the Policies establish expectations of physicians’
behaviour and are “intended to have normative force”. As such,
they may be used as evidence of professional standards in support
of an allegation of professional misconduct.
 The College introduced the Policies in 2015 and 2016. The
first was Policy Statement #2-15, entitled “Professional Obliga-
tions and Human Rights” (the “Human Rights Policy”), which
contains the following effective referral requirement:
Where physicians are unwilling to provide certain elements of care for reasons
of conscience or religion, an effective referral to another health-care provider
must be provided to the patient. An effective referral means a referral made in
good faith, to a non-objecting, available, and accessible physician, other health-
care professional, or agency. The referral must be made in a timely manner to
allow patients to access care. Patients must not be exposed to adverse clinical
outcomes due to a delayed referral. Physicians must not impede access to care
for existing patients, or those seeking to become patients.
2 The Human Rights Policy also contains the following provision: “Physicians
must provide care in an emergency, where it is necessary to prevent imminent harm, even where that care conflicts with their conscience or religious
beliefs.” This provision was challenged in the Divisional Court. However, the
Divisional Court noted that all the individual appellants agreed that they
would not object to performing an abortion where it was necessary to save
a pregnant woman’s life and the appellant organizations agreed most of their
members would take the same position: para. 218. Thus, the Divisional Court
found that there was no evidence that the emergency provision would raise
a concern even if the provision were interpreted to require the provision of
treatment to prevent a serious deterioration of health short of saving a patient’s
life: para. 218. It dismissed the applications in relation to the emergency provision. The appellants do not pursue the issue in this court.