(3) Do the effective referral requirements of the Policies infringe
the appellants’ s. 15(1) equality rights?
(4) If there is an infringement of the appellants’ Charter rights
and/or freedoms, is it justified under s. 1 of the Charter?
(1) Standard of review and the framework for analysis
 The appellants agree with the Divisional Court’s conclusion that the standard of review to be applied to the Policies was
correctness and that Oakes provided the applicable framework for
analysis. The College disagrees on both points, submitting that
the constitutional review of a policy articulating standards of
conduct for members of a profession should be conducted under
a reasonableness standard and the Doré/Loyola framework.
 The normal rules of appellate review of lower court
decisions, articulated in Housen v. Nikolaisen,  2 S.C.R.
235,  S.C.J. No. 31, 2002 SCC 33, apply on this appeal.
Questions of law are reviewed on a correctness standard, and
questions of fact and mixed fact and law are reviewed on a standard of palpable and overriding error: Housen, at paras. 8, 10,
36-37. The Divisional Court’s selection and application of the
correctness standard to the Policies is a question of law and is
accordingly reviewed by this court on a correctness standard.
 Ordinarily, this court would be called upon to determine
whether the Divisional Court chose the correct standard of review
and applied it properly: Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness),  2 S.C.R. 559,  S.C.J. No.
36, 2013 SCC 36, at paras. 45-47; Dr. Q v. College of Physicians
and Surgeons of British Columbia,  1 S.C.R. 226, 
S.C.J. No. 18, 2003 SCC 19, at para. 43; and College of Physicians
and Surgeons of Ontario v. Peirovy (2018), 143 O.R. (3d) 596,
 O.J. No. 2341, 2018 ONCA 420, at para. 52. However, the
parties agree that the outcome of this appeal is unaffected by
the choice of standard of review and framework for analysis,
because the purpose of both frameworks is to determine whether
the Policies unreasonably limit the appellants’ Charter rights or
freedoms: Doré, at para. 6. Accordingly, I would leave for another
day the question of which standard of review and framework
ought to be applied in these circumstances. For the purposes of
these reasons, I simply apply the standard and framework chosen
by the Divisional Court, which formed the basis of the parties’
submissions on appeal. Nevertheless, like the Divisional Court, I
would reach the same result applying a reasonableness standard
and the Doré/Loyola framework.