practice area rather than face prosecution for failing to do so. In
my view, the Divisional Court correctly concluded that the interference with the appellants’ freedom of religion is neither trivial
Freedom of conscience
 Having found that the Policies infringe the individual
appellants’ freedom of religion, the Divisional Court declined to
rule on the appellants’ alternative argument that the effective
referral requirements also infringe the appellants’ freedom of
conscience. The appellants briefly addressed this issue in oral
 The intervenors, the OMA and the CCRL et al., assert that
the Divisional Court ought to have addressed the freedom of conscience issue and urge this court to do so.
 It has been held that freedom of conscience and religion
should be “broadly construed to extend to conscientiously-held
beliefs, whether grounded in religion or in a secular morality”:
see R. v. Morgentaler,  1 S.C.R. 30,  S.C.J. No. 1, at
p. 179 S.C.R. The scope of freedom of conscience may be broader
than freedom of religion, extending to the protection of strongly
held moral and ethical beliefs that are not necessarily founded in
religion: Roach v. Canada (Minister of State for Multiculturalism
and Citizenship),  F.C.J. No. 33, 113 D.L.R. (4th) 67 (C.A.),
at p. 82 D.L.R.
 The OMA submits that the Policies apply to physicians
who object to the Policies for reasons of conscience and that the
court should engage in a thorough analysis of this issue in order
to give guidance to the medical profession.
 The CCRL et al. submit that the effective referral
requirements violate physicians’ “preservative freedom of conscience” — the freedom not to do what is perceived to be wrong.
Forcing them to participate in perceived wrongdoing is an
assault on their human dignity and deprives them of meaningful
choice. They submit that this case affords an opportunity to give
definition and scope to freedom of conscience, and to incorporate
freedom of conscience principles into the Oakes analysis.
 The evidentiary record in this case is insufficient to
support an analysis of freedom of conscience. To the extent the
individual appellants raise issues of conscience, they are inextricably grounded in their religious beliefs. There is an insufficient basis
on which to determine whether there are Ontario physicians who
would regard the effective referral of patients as equivalent to participating in the medical services at issue and who would
object to doing so on the basis of conscience. I find that, at its