The onus at this stage is on the College to establish, on
a balance of probabilities, that the infringement of the appellants’
freedom of religion is a reasonable limit, demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society: Multani, at para. 43.
 In Oakes, at pp. 135 and 138-39 S.C.R., Dickson C.J.C.
articulated a framework for the s. 1 analysis, which can be sum-
marized as follows:
(a) the Charter-infringing measure must be “prescribed by law”;
(b) the objective of the impugned measure must be of sufficient importance
to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom;
(c) the means chosen must be reasonable and demonstrably justified — this
is a “form of proportionality test” which will vary in the circumstances,
but requires a balancing of the interests of society with the interests of
individuals and groups and has three components:
( i) the measure must be rationally connected to the objective — i.e.,
carefully designed to achieve the objective and not arbitrary, unfair
or based on irrational considerations;
( ii) the means chosen should impair the Charter right or freedom as
little as possible; and
( iii) there must be proportionality between the salutary and deleterious
effects of the measure.
(a) Prescribed by law
 As noted above, s. 1 requires that limits to Charter rights
and freedoms must be “prescribed by law”. The Policies were
enacted by the College pursuant to its authority under the RHPA.
The Divisional Court, citing Greater Vancouver Transportation
Authority, held, at para. 137, that the Charter may apply to activities
of a regulatory entity such as the College to the extent that its
activities can be said to be governmental in nature. In particular,
where a government policy is “authorized by statute and sets out
a general norm or standard that is meant to be binding and is
sufficiently accessible and precise, the policy is legislative in
nature and constitutes a limit that is ‘prescribed by law’” for the
purpose of the Oakes analysis. The parties do not dispute that
this principle applies to the exercise of the College’s statutory
mandate and that the effective referral requirements of the Policies
are limits “prescribed by law”.
(b) Pressing and substantial objective
 It must be established that the objective of the effective
referral requirements is sufficiently important to warrant limiting
a constitutional right or freedom: see Multani, at para. 43; and